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Innovation and Own Prior Art 
AMY R. MOTOMURA† 
This Article analyzes a conflict between innovation and the patent system: innovation is a 
dynamic, iterative process, but a patent reflects only a single snapshot in time. Despite extensive 
scholarly and judicial discussion of when an invention is ready for patenting, there is rarely a 
perfect time to file a patent application. Instead of filing a single perfect application, companies 
and others engaged in innovation typically build a portfolio of patents by filing a series of 
applications over the course of research and development. Yet this is an imperfect strategy 
because each patent application sets up a potential barrier for an innovator’s future applications. 
The barrier arises because future applications must be both new and nonobvious as compared to 
most of the innovator’s existing patent applications. 
This Article examines the interaction between patent applicants’ own earlier-filed applications 
and patentability requirements. This interaction shapes how innovators seek patent rights, and it 
affects disclosure and innovation. Despite its significance, the legal treatment of successive patent 
filings by the same innovator developed haphazardly. The resulting statutory framework, built by 
the layering of various provisions, is not well-tailored to the original policy goals. Moreover, in 
its current form, the law has unintended effects that can hamper innovation. This Article proposes 
a statutory amendment that would provide a better mechanism for directly tailoring the statutory 
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INTRODUCTION 
In contrast to the fabled “Eureka!” moment, innovation is more commonly 
a drawn-out, iterative process. Even when an innovation as a whole is 
pioneering, it may be achieved not in a flash of genius, but rather through a series 
of carefully planned steps forward.1 And once the outlines of an invention are 
clear, making an idea actually work in practice takes time and effort; the “best” 
version is usually the result of a series of refinements. But one of the key legal 
mechanisms for protecting the result of innovation—a patent—reflects only a 
single snapshot in time.2 The content of a patent application cannot be changed 
after filing,3 and much of patent law hinges on the particular date on which the 
application was filed.4 Moreover, various aspects of patent law discourage an 
inventor from waiting to file a patent application until the innovation process is 
complete. Indeed, patent law often pushes an inventor to file well before this.5 
As a result, patents are in most cases an inherently imperfect mechanism 
for disclosing and protecting innovation. Others have identified and discussed 
variations of this problem, particularly by considering the optimal moment in 
the innovation process that balances this tension.6 But the fundamental problem 
remains that even the optimal moment to file a patent application will rarely be 
a perfect one. 
The practical result of this tension between innovation and the patent 
system is that companies and others engaged in research and development 
typically rely not on a single patent, but rather on a series of patents filed over 
time.7 This approach allows companies to account for innovation trajectories, 
not only in the narrow sense of iterative improvements to a particular invention, 
 
 1. In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276, 1304 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (Baldwin, J., concurring); see Ted Sichelman, 
Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 347–54 (2010). 
 2. Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Disclosures and Time, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1459, 1460 (2016); see Jeanne 
C. Fromer, Dynamic Patent Disclosure, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1715, 1716–22 (2016). 
 3. See 35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 1.53(b) (2018). The claims can be changed after filing but 
only within the bounds of what was originally disclosed. See Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 
1473, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Tun-Jen Chiang, Fixing Patent Boundaries, 108 MICH. L. REV. 523, 534–36 (2010). 
Nonsubstantive changes to the specification and figures are permitted. 
 4. See Holbrook, supra note 2, at 1468–81. This is particularly true after the transition to a first-to-file 
system in 2013 with implementation of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”). See id. at 1471–73; 
Robert P. Merges, Priority and Novelty under the AIA, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1023, 1024 (2012). 
 5. See infra notes 23–29 and accompanying text. 
 6. See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 65 
(2009); Paul R. Gugliuzza, Early Filing and Functional Claiming, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1223 (2016); Dmitry 
Karshtedt, The Completeness Requirement in Patent Law, 56 B.C. L. REV. 949 (2015); Mark A. Lemley, Ready 
for Patenting, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1171 (2016); Dotan Oliar & James Y. Stern, Right on Time: First Possession in 
Property and Intellectual Property, 99 B.U. L. REV. 395 (2019); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Pierson, Peer Review, 
and Patent Law, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1825 (2016); see also Fromer, supra note 2 (discussing the limitations of 
“early and static” patent disclosure and arguing for post-filing disclosure of patentees’ and licensees’ covered 
commercialized products). Considerations of this tension sometimes focus (with more or less emphasis) on the 
effects of timing on the balance of rights between multiple parties. 
 7. Cf. Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 27–43 (2005) 
(discussing patent portfolios and their benefits, including benefits for a firm’s subsequent innovation due to 
broader scope of protection). 
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but also to track interrelated research and development projects with different 
but overlapping timelines. 
But relying on a series of patents over time is an imperfect solution. 
Innovators face constraints in using successive patents to track innovation. 
Although there is no formal barrier to filing new patent applications as frequently 
as desired, innovators are unlikely to successfully obtain patent rights from all 
of these filings. This is because patent law enforces a certain amount of spacing 
between patent rights—that is, each set of patent rights must typically be 
sufficiently different from the last. Suppose that a company files a first patent 
application on an invention and then makes improvements to the invention. If 
the improved invention is too similar to the original one, the company may not 
be able to patent the improvements, even when those improvements are 
important—for example, they make the invention commercially successful or 
fix a problem discovered in the original design. 
The doctrinal basis for this spacing between patent rights originates from 
the requirement that patentable inventions be not only new but also 
“nonobvious.”8 The nonobviousness requirement has been described as “the 
cornerstone of the patent bargain” and “indispensable for maintaining an optimal 
balance between incentivizing new innovation and providing public access to 
existing innovation.”9 That is, patents are designed to protect—and thus 
promote—only innovation that is different enough from what came before it that 
its benefit to society outweighs the social cost of exclusivity. The 
nonobviousness doctrine sets the boundary between what is sufficiently different 
to merit patent protection and what is not.10 This prevents the patent system from 
channeling innovation incentives toward trivial inventions.11 
Without the nonobviousness doctrine, different patentees would each be 
able to obtain rights to slight modifications of the same invention. The 
requirement that patentable inventions be “novel” similarly prevents different 
patentees from each obtaining rights to the same invention. Without these 
patentability requirements, many similar patent rights could be held by many 
different patentees, and as such it would be difficult to navigate these rights in 
 
 8. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2018). This Article focuses on U.S. patent law, but a requirement similar to 
nonobviousness is present in nearly every country’s patent laws. See John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case 
Study of Legal Innovation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2007). 
 9. Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña & Ryan Whalen, A Network Theory of Patentability, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 63, 
63–65 (2020); see also Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Law Viewed Through an Evidentiary Lens: The 
“Suggestion Test” as a Rule of Evidence, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1517, 1526 (2006) (“[The nonobviousness 
doctrine’s] effective and proper enforcement is crucial to maintaining the social cost-benefit balance the patent 
system attempts to implement.”); ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND 
POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 608 (6th ed. 2013). 
 10. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 9, at 608; Cotropia, supra note 9, at 1524; Pedraza-Fariña & Whalen, 
supra note 9, at 65. 
 11. Cf. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 9, at 609 (describing that “granting patents to obvious developments 
may compromise the incentives that the patent system provides to develop nonobvious inventions”). 
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order to bring an invention to market. Thus, these thickets would hinder rather 
than promote innovation.12 
But this theoretical basis for the patentability requirements is based on a 
scenario in which there are two different patentees. In the context of a single 
patentee, the considerations are different and complex.13 One of the effects of 
these patentability requirements as applied to a single patentee is a limitation on 
the ability to obtain a series of patent rights tracking the innovation process. 
To account for the particular considerations in the case of a single patentee, 
the Patent Act14 has been amended over time to include provisions giving limited 
preferential treatment to original patent applicants when they file patent 
applications on later improvements.15 This preferential treatment allows the 
original applicant to patent otherwise unpatentable innovation. This is a notable 
exception to two basic principles of patent law: that the “right to patent 
improvements on a technology is a common right”16 and that slight variations of 
inventions already described in patents are dedicated to the public domain.17 
This Article sets out the first in-depth analysis of the law that creates this 
preferential treatment, and more broadly, its effects on innovation and 
disclosure. These effects are pervasive and complex, and they shape patent 
applicant strategy. Yet, their scholarly analysis is limited,18 likely in part because 
 
 12. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 9, at 609–10; Pedraza-Fariña & Whalen, supra note 9, at 65. 
 13. John Duffy has said that improvement patents granted to “a pioneer patentee may present issues 
different from the canonical situation in which many similarly situated inventors are seeking patents conferring 
immediate market exclusivity,” and have “unique aspects” that “seem sufficiently great as to demand more 
detailed treatment.” John F. Duffy, A Timing Approach to Patentability, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 343, 366 
(2008). 
 14. 35 U.S.C. (2018).  
 15. Inventors or entities applying for patents are termed “applicants.” See 37 C.F.R. § 1.42 (2018). This is 
new under the AIA; previously, only inventors could be “applicants” for U.S. patents. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.41 
(2010). As Parts II and IV describe, the preferential treatment discussed in this Article is not based on the identity 
of the “applicant” in a strict sense. However, for lack of a better term, this Article uses “original patent applicant” 
or “original applicant” throughout. 
 16. John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 488 (2004). 
 17. See Pedraza-Fariña & Whalen, supra note 9, at 63, 65 (“Patent law is built upon a fundamental premise: 
only significant inventions receive patent protection while minor improvements remain in the public domain.”); 
see also MARTIN J. ADELMAN, RANDALL R. RADER & JOHN R. THOMAS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT 
LAW 307 (5th ed. 2019) (describing that the nonobviousness doctrine “creates a ‘patent-free’ zone around the 
state of the art”); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. 
REV. 989, 1008 (1997) (describing “minor improvers” as others whose improvements are too small to be 
patentable as compared to the original patent owner). 
 18. There is some discussion of this preferential treatment in the literature on “secret prior art,” since the 
preferential treatment is an exception to the general rule that an earlier-filed (“secret”) and subsequently 
published patent application is retroactively effective as prior art as of its filing date. There, the preferential 
treatment has been referred to as a limitation on “self-collision.” See, e.g., Kate H. Murashige, The Hilmer 
Doctrine, Self-Collision, Novelty and the Definition of Prior Art, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 549, 556–57 (1993); 
C. Douglass Thomas, Secret Prior Art—Get Your Priorities Straight!, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 147, 160–64 (1996).  
  I have identified three instances of scholars touching on the theory or strategic role of the particular 
preferential treatment upon which this Article focuses. See Duffy, supra note 8, at 16 (discussing the 
nonobviousness requirement’s role in allocating rewards among inventors, and how if both applications are 
owned by a single entity, the earlier application is not prior art for obviousness analysis because “[t]he same 
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they operate in the background to influence patent applicant behavior with little 
external evidence. 
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I discusses the difficulty of 
mapping innovation processes to the patent system and sets forth a taxonomy of 
the types of innovation that cannot be easily captured. Part I also situates this 
Article within related scholarship. Part II analyzes how preferential treatment 
for original patent applicants developed piecemeal over time through targeted 
amendments in response to this mapping problem, as well as through 
amendments to seemingly unrelated portions of the Patent Act. Part III then 
explores and evaluates the effects of preferential treatment. In particular, I argue 
that preferential treatment can promote certain disclosure and innovation. 
Part IV begins by describing today’s complex statutory framework for 
preferential treatment and the limitations of that framework. Part IV concludes 
by offering an alternative approach. 
I.  MAPPING INNOVATION ONTO PATENTS 
A.  THE SHORTCOMINGS OF A SINGLE PATENT 
Innovation is rarely a simple process. Transforming an initial idea into a 
completed, perfected, or commercially viable invention often involves long 
timelines, many iterations, and extensive collaboration.19 James Dyson, for 
example, has written that creation of his bag-less vacuum cleaner took 5,127 
prototypes and fifteen years.20 He describes his company as “develop[ing] 
 
party will receive the rewards from both patents in such cases, so allocating rewards among parties is not a 
concern. The law thus eliminates the nonobviousness requirement in those circumstances and allows the granting 
of patents, provided that at least mere novelty exists over the prior commonly owned invention.”); Douglas L. 
Rogers, Double Patenting: Follow-on Pharmaceutical Patents that Suppress Competition, 14 NW. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 317, 375–79 (2017) (arguing that double patenting doctrine should be expanded to prevent the 
same inventor or employer from patenting a species within the scope of its existing genus patent, and discussing 
how this can compensate for the expanded exceptions to prior art under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act); 
Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV. 503, 522 n.98 
(2009) (describing that researchers who submit an original patent application rejected by the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) for lacking utility can, unlike a different set of researchers, file another application 
with additional evidence of utility within twelve months of publication of the original application).  
  Scholarship on obviousness-type double patenting is also related to the preferential treatment I consider 
here. See, e.g., Emily A. Evans & Jill A. Jacobson, Double Patenting Recapitulated, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK 
OFF. SOC’Y 625 (2005); Christopher M. Holman, The Federal Circuit’s Ongoing Expansion of Obviousness-
Type Double Patenting Creates Patent Prosecution Pitfalls, 33 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 94 (2014); Daniel 
Kazhdan, Obviousness-Type Double Patenting: Why It Exists and When It Applies, 53 AKRON L. REV. 1017 
(2019). Obviousness-type double patenting doctrine also addresses the conditions under which a patentee can 
have two patents claiming obvious variants of an invention. It is, however, a special limitation on original patent 
applicants’ ability to obtain patents, even when those patents are not unpatentable under the novelty and 
nonobviousness requirements. 
 19. See Sichelman, supra note 1, at 347–54 (describing the many steps in a “stylized overview of the 
innovation path from conception to a marketable good”). 
 20. James Dyson, No Innovator’s Dilemma Here: In Praise of Failure, WIRED (Apr. 8, 2011, 8:00 PM), 
https://www.wired.com/2011/04/in-praise-of-failure/; see also How I Built This with Guy Raz, Dyson: James 
Dyson, NPR (Feb. 12, 2018, 12:01 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/03/26/584331881/dyson-james-dyson. 
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technology iteratively—making the smallest changes, building prototype after 
prototype until we have got it as close to perfect as we can muster. Testing and 
prototyping is at the heart of the most successful technologies.”21 This is true 
across industries; in pharmaceutical innovation, for example, drug discovery and 
pre-clinical testing of compounds take on average six and a half years, and this 
process usually involves numerous research teams building upon each other’s 
work.22 
Innovation that happens in this way cannot be easily captured by a single 
patent application. It is usually unreasonable to expect a patent applicant to wait 
for the completion of the innovation process to file for a patent. This is because 
the patent system permits, incentivizes, and sometimes forces inventors to file 
before its completion.23 
The patent system permits early filing because inventors do not need to 
have actually made the invention (“actual reduction to practice”) at the time of 
filing, nor do they need to know that the invention works. They must only 
“constructively reduce to practice” their invention by describing it in the patent 
application.24 
The patent system also incentivizes early filing by providing an advantage 
to earlier filers.25 This is particularly true after the transition to a first-to-file 
system in the United States in 2013, which makes patentability a function of the 
date on which the application was filed.26 
Finally, activities in the normal course of innovation may force applicants 
to file before the end of the innovation process. Certain activities can render an 
invention unpatentable unless a patent application is filed within the following 
year.27 For example, clinical trial activities, grant proposals, and discussions 
with potential investors can create enough risk of starting this one-year clock 
that cautious applicants will file before it expires.28 
 
 21. Stephen Dowling, Frustration and Failure Fuel Dyson’s Success, BBC: FUTURE (Mar. 13, 2013), 
https://www.bbc.com/future/story/20130312-failure-is-the-best-medicine. 
 22. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-07-49, NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT: SCIENCE, BUSINESS, 
REGULATORY, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES CITED AS HAMPERING DRUG DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS 6 
(2006), https://www.gao.gov/assets/260/253726.pdf. 
 23. See Cotropia, supra note 6, at 72–82; Lemley, supra note 6, at 1172–85. 
 24. Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Cotropia, supra note 6, at 69–70, 73–75; 
Lemley, supra note 6, at 1177–78; Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 621, 628–30 (2010). 
 25. See Cotropia, supra note 6, at 78–80; Lemley, supra note 6, at 1179. 
 26. See Lemley, supra note 6, at 1180–82; Merges, supra note 4, at 1024.  
 27. Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2018). 
 28. Cf. Janet Freilich, Prophetic Patents, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663, 685 (2019) (describing that whether 
clinical trials involve public disclosure is a “particularly contentious issue,” and that “[t]hough appropriate 
confidentiality agreements can prevent clinical trials of a drug from blocking later patenting of the drug, it is a 
sufficiently problematic issue that the question is frequently litigated”); Brenda M. Simon, Patents, Information, 
and Innovation, 85 BROOK. L. REV. 727, 765 (2020) (describing the importance of having patents on file for 
self-revealing inventions before disclosing them to investors to avoid expropriation and the risk of “likely 
los[ing] the ability to obtain patent protection later”); E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Cetus Corp., No. C-89-
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The result is that an applicant’s first-filed patent application will typically 
fail to reflect a large portion of the innovation process.29 Yet, once the patent 
application is filed, its content cannot be updated to describe new 
developments.30 New developments can be described in a new patent 
application, but not in the original one.31 
A number of scholars have addressed the difficulty of mapping innovation 
onto a single patent application. Some of these scholars consider the optimal 
timing for the application to be filed, and how patent practices or doctrines can 
be adjusted to achieve this timing.32 Many have critiqued the current system for 
both allowing and encouraging innovators to file too early, reducing patents’ 
socially beneficial functions.33 Some have proposed reforms to push inventors 
to file later in the innovation process, including new or heightened patentability 
or disclosure requirements or better enforcement of current requirements.34 
 
2860 MHP, 1990 WL 305551, at *8 n.7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 1990) (suggesting that a National Science Foundation 
grant proposal was a “printed publication” under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)).  
  Applicants interested in patent protection outside the United States will usually file before the potential 
disclosure, rather than relying on the one-year grace period, because many foreign patent laws do not provide a 
grace period. See Merges, supra note 4, at 1046 (“[T]he AIA diverges from the international norm which 
approximates an ‘absolute novelty’ standard.”); see, e.g., Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 54, 
Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199 (“(1) An invention shall be considered to be new if it does not form part of the 
state of the art. (2) The state of the art shall be held to comprise everything made available to the public . . . before 
the date of filing of the European patent application.”). 
 29. See Dan L. Burk, Patent Silences, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1603, 1621–22 (2016); Colleen V. Chien, 
Contextualizing Patent Disclosure, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1849, 1852 (2016); Cotropia, supra note 6, at 88–96; 
Fromer, supra note 2, at 1715–16; Sichelman, supra note 1, at 355–56. 
 30. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.  
 31. Patent law does provide a type of application that is in between an original and new patent application: 
a “continuation-in-part.” A continuation-in-part is an application that adds additional disclosure to an earlier-
filed application (the so-called “parent” application). In re Wertheim, 646 F.2d 527, 536 (C.C.P.A. 1981). 
Despite the nomenclature, claims based on the additional disclosure in a continuation-in-part are treated no 
differently than an entirely new application when patentability is assessed. Cf. Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool 
Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1438 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“New matter in a C-I-P application has the filing date of that C-I-
P application. The earlier filing date of the parent application pertains to material in the C-I-P application also 
disclosed in the prior application.”); see also Robert Paradiso & Elizabeth Pietrowski, Think Twice Before Filing 
that CIP Application, 196 N.J. L.J. 1, 1–2 (2009); Catherine M. Polizzi, Kicking the CIP Habit: The Perils of 
Continuation-In-Part Practice, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Feb. 2006, at 10, 10–12. Nonetheless, applicants often 
file continuations-in-part to disclose subject matter that builds upon their existing patent applications, and some 
applicants—and even some patent practitioners—believe that such filings avoid the parent applications as prior 
art. See Paradiso & Pietrowski, supra, at 2; Polizzi, supra, at 11–12.  
 32. See, e.g., Cotropia, supra note 6, at 119–28 (proposing requiring actual reduction to practice before 
examination); Karshtedt, supra note 6, at 992–1013 (proposing codifying a “completeness” requirement for 
patentability); Lemley, supra note 6, at 1191–95 (suggesting several ways to correct patent law’s increasing bias 
“towards encouraging ideas at the expense of those who take the time to develop and test their inventions”); 
Ouellette, supra note 6, at 1842–47 (arguing for experimenting with a peer review system to help patent 
examiners assess whether the enablement requirement is met); Seymore, supra note 24, at 621, 641–57 
(proposing “a new examination protocol which gives the U.S. Patent Office the ability to request working 
examples when the disclosure’s teaching appears dubious,” effectively requiring actual reduction to practice for 
complex inventions). 
 33. See, e.g., Cotropia, supra note 6, at 72–82, 87–119; Fromer, supra note 2, at 1716–21; Lemley, supra 
note 6, at 1180–91; Ouellette, supra note 6, at 1826–36; Seymore, supra note 24, at 628–32. 
 34. See supra note 32. 
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Other scholars propose reforms to promote disclosure of new developments after 
a patent application is filed. Scholars have suggested, for example, encouraging 
updates to include the results of experiments,35 requiring patentees and licensees 
to disclose information about commercialized products covered by the 
patentees’ patents,36 and encouraging patent applicants to disclose experimental 
failure.37 
This scholarship focuses on optimizing a single patent application’s ability 
to capture dynamic innovation. In contrast, when scholars consider the 
alternative approach of an innovator using multiple patent applications to 
capture innovation, that approach is often described as undesirable, and even a 
result of improper behavior.38 Some scholarship suggests that filing multiple 
applications is a symptom of patent applicants filing too early in the innovation 
process.39 Other scholarship raises concerns about follow-on patents for 
pharmaceuticals, which can result in patents on small, and sometimes clinically 
insignificant, variations in order to extend patent protection and delay generic 
versions.40 Others critique companies’ extensive patenting driven by the 
strategic value of a large portfolio (not by the value of any particular patent) and 
argue that this creates patent thickets that hurt innovation.41 
All of these concerns are worth raising. But applicants seeking multiple 
patents during the course of innovation are often acting neither frivolously nor 
improperly. Any applicant pursuing patent protection must make hard decisions 
about when to file one or more patent applications and what to include in those 
applications. This is particularly true when research and development includes 
 
 35. See Freilich, supra note 28, at 722–23 (proposing “creating a mechanism to encourage updating of 
hypothetical examples”). 
 36. See Fromer, supra note 2, at 1722–31 (“Whenever a patentee or a licensee releases a new product or 
version of an existing product that the patentee perceives, or should perceive, to be covered by one or more of 
the patentee’s patents, the patentee would have a legal obligation to file information expeditiously with the Patent 
and Trademark Office . . . on the existence of the commercialized product and its coverage by the relevant 
patents. The PTO would make this information available to the public, linking it directly to the relevant 
patents.”).  
 37. See Sean B. Seymore, Patenting Around Failure, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1139, 1177–86 (2018) (proposing 
disclosure of experimental failures in applications’ prosecution histories and discussing strategies for 
incentivizing this disclosure). 
 38. But cf. Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 7, at 27–43 (discussing the value of patent portfolios, 
including “eas[ing] subsequent in-house innovation” and “adjust[ing] for changing technology as [a firm] 
attempts to navigate the path of a research and development effort”). 
 39. See, e.g., Cotropia, supra note 6, at 69, 96–97, 101, 103. 
 40. See, e.g., Robin Feldman, May Your Drug Price Be Evergreen, 5 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 590 (2018); 
Aaron S. Kesselheim, Michael A. Fischer & Jerry Avorn, Extensions of Intellectual Property Rights and Delayed 
Adoption of Generic Drugs: Effects on Medicaid Spending, 25 HEALTH AFFS. 1637, 1638, 1643 (2006). But see 
Christopher M. Holman, Timo Minssen & Eric M. Solovy, Patentability Standards for Follow-On 
Pharmaceutical Innovation, 37 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 131, 137–39 (2018) (arguing that “the concern over 
such so-called evergreening is . . . to a large extent illusory”). 
 41. See, e.g., Gregory R. Day & W. Michael Schuster, Patent Inequality, 71 ALA. L. REV. 115 (2019) 
(arguing that powerful firms with large patent portfolios hurt innovation, and surveying other scholarship in this 
area). 
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a web of interrelated projects with overlapping and shifting scope as well as 
different, often unpredictable, timelines. 
B.  THE SHORTCOMINGS OF MULTIPLE PATENTS 
Although the realities of research and development often push applicants 
to rely on multiple patent applications, this strategy also has its limitations. 
When innovation that happens after the filing of an initial patent application—
what this Article refers to as “post-filing innovation”—is sufficiently different 
from what is described in the initial application to be novel and nonobvious in 
comparison, multiple patent applications are a reasonable strategy for capturing 
that innovation.  
A more complex situation arises when post-filing innovation is not 
sufficiently different. As a general rule, slight variations of inventions already 
described in patents are dedicated to the public domain.42 This means that, 
without an exception to that general rule, an innovator’s initial patent application 
can prevent the innovator from patenting certain post-filing innovation. This 
Article refers to this unpatentable post-filing innovation as “supplementary 
innovation.” Supplementary innovation often includes the small steps that 
characterize much of day-to-day research and development; the Subparts that 
follow provide examples of supplementary innovation and suggest a taxonomy 
with three dimensions. 
1.  Minor and Deepening Supplementary Innovation 
The first of these dimensions relates to the statutory basis for 
supplementary innovation’s unpatentability. Some supplementary innovation is 
different from what is described in an original applicant’s existing patent 
application, but not sufficiently different to be nonobvious in comparison. This 
Article terms this kind of innovation “minor” supplementary innovation.43 Other 
supplementary innovation is different from what is described in an existing 
patent application, yet is rendered not novel (“anticipated”) by it. This Article 
terms this “deepening” supplementary innovation.44 
Post-filing research and development efforts often result in minor 
supplementary innovation when the original patent applicant seeks to improve 
 
 42. See Pedraza-Fariña & Whalen, supra note 9, at 63, 65; see also ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 17, at 
307; Lemley, supra note 17, at 1008. 
 43. Others have used similar terminology for follow-on innovation by others. For example, Mark Lemley 
has used the term “minor improver” in the context of patent law for others whose improvements are too small 
to be patentable as compared to the original patent owner, and in the context of copyright law for others who 
make small improvements to original work that receive no special protection under copyright law. See Lemley, 
supra note 17, at 1007–08, 1019–20; see also Dennis S. Karjala, Distinguishing Patent and Copyright Subject 
Matter, 35 CONN. L. REV. 439, 471 n.128 (2003) (using the terms “minor improver” and “small improver” in 
the context of copyright law). 
 44. This term is borrowed from Nicholson Price, who uses it to describe “innovation that tells us more 
about existing technology.” W. Nicholson Price II, The Cost of Novelty, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 769, 769 (2020). 
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or optimize the technology. The facts of In re Chu provide an example:45 
Babcock & Wilcox, an energy and environmental technology company,46 
developed a device for reducing pollutant emissions from coal-fired electric 
power plants. The device had a “baghouse” containing components that 
chemically reacted with the pollutants to remove them from the waste gases 
created during combustion of fossil fuels.47 A little over a year after filing a 
patent application on the device, Babcock & Wilcox filed another application on 
a device in which the location of the catalyst had been adjusted to improve 
performance.48 The new location was not described in the first application,49 but 
it would likely be obvious under current law and would thus be minor 
supplementary innovation.50 
Deepening innovation, on the other hand, often results when the original 
patent applicant seeks to better understand how its existing invention works. An 
innovator need not understand how or why an invention works at the time of 
filing the original application.51 Thus, this understanding often comes from post-
filing innovation. For example, the drug company Schering Corporation 
originally patented loratadine, the active ingredient in Claritin®.52 Several years 
after filing the original application,53 Schering patented a compound (a 
“metabolite”) that it had found was created during digestion of loratadine. But 
the metabolite claims were later invalidated based on Schering’s own loratadine 
patent: the metabolite necessarily formed when patients took loratadine and was 
thus “inherently” disclosed by the loratadine patent.54 Because the loratadine 
 
 45. In re Chu, 66 F.3d 292 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 46. See Explore B&W, BABCOCK & WILCOX, https://www.babcock.com/en/about (last visited Feb. 4, 
2021).   
 47. See U.S. Patent No. 4,871,522, at [57], col. 2 (filed July 25, 1988). 
 48. Chu, 66 F.3d at 295–99; U.S. Patent No. 5,567,394, at [63], [73] (filed Oct. 2, 1990). The new 
application was a continuation-in-part of the original application. See ’394 Patent, at [63] (describing the 
application as a continuation of abandoned U.S. Patent Application No. 404,153, filed September 7, 1989, which 
was a continuation-in-part of the ’522 Patent). 
 49. Chu, 66 F.3d at 295–99. 
 50. The USPTO found the catalyst location obvious. Id. at 296. On appeal, the Federal Circuit held the 
location of the catalyst to be nonobvious, in part because there was no “teaching or suggestion” in the prior art 
leading to the new location. Id. at 299. Since the decision, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected rigid 
application of the “teaching or suggestion” test for obviousness; under the new standard, many more claimed 
inventions are obvious. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415–23 (2007); Harold C. Wegner, 
Making Sense of KSR and Other Recent Patent Cases, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 39, 41 (2007). A 
detailed analysis of post-KSR nonobviousness doctrine and its application to the facts of In re Chu is beyond the 
scope of this Article; I describe the facts of the case only as an example of innovation likely to be minor 
supplementary innovation. 
 51. Sean B. Seymore, Patenting the Unexplained, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 707, 719–26 (2019). 
 52. Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 53. Compare U.S. Patent No. 4,282,233, at [22] (filed June 19, 1980), with U.S. Patent No. 4,659,716, at 
[22] (filed Mar. 12, 1986). 
 54. Schering, 339 F.3d at 1375, 1382. Under the inherency doctrine, a claimed invention is anticipated if 
it was “necessarily present” in the prior art, regardless of whether the prior art recognized or appreciated it. Id. 
at 1377. Inherency can also play a role in obviousness analysis. See Par Pharm., Inc. v. TWi Pharm., Inc., 773 
F.3d 1186, 1194–96 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
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patent anticipated the metabolite claims, the metabolite is an example of 
deepening innovation. 
2.  Encompassed and Broadening Supplementary Innovation 
Supplementary innovation can also be classified as “encompassed” or 
“broadening.” This Article terms supplementary innovation “encompassed” 
when, although the supplementary innovation is not described in the original 
patent application, the original application can still be used to protect the 
supplementary innovation. This is the case when supplementary innovation is 
within the scope of patentable claims of the original application. For example, 
imagine that Babcock & Wilcox’s first patent for reducing pollutant emissions 
claimed “an apparatus for controlling emissions of a fossil fuel fired boiler, 
comprising: a flue gas duct; a fabric baghouse; and a catalyst.” With this claim, 
the particular location of the catalyst is not specified. Thus, an improved device 
with a relocated catalyst would still be “covered” by the claims. 
But in other instances, supplementary innovation is not within the scope of 
patentable claims of the original patent application. Thus, the original patent 
applicant cannot protect the supplementary innovation using a patent resulting 
from the original application.55 This Article terms this type of supplementary 
innovation “broadening.” Suppose instead that Babcock & Wilcox’s first patent 
claimed “an apparatus for controlling emissions of a fossil fuel fired boiler, 
comprising: a flue gas duct; a fabric baghouse; and a catalyst located outside the 
fabric baghouse.” This claim would not cover an improved device in which the 
catalyst had been relocated into the fabric baghouse. Because broadening 
supplementary innovation cannot be protected by the original application,56 and 
because it is not patentable as compared to the original application, it will be 
dedicated to the public domain absent some form of special treatment for the 
original applicant. 
3.  No-Fault and At-Fault Supplementary Innovation 
Thus far, this Article has described supplementary innovation as a natural 
result of the iterative and complex nature of research and development; most 
innovators will carry out at least some post-filing innovation after filing a patent 
application. That said, supplementary innovation can also be classified based on 
the extent to which the original patent applicant is “at fault” for its post-filing 
innovation being rendered unpatentable by its original application. 
 
 55. The original patent applicant can protect certain innovation that is slightly outside the bounds of its 
original patent’s claims. Under the doctrine of equivalents, “a product or process that does not literally infringe 
upon the express terms of a patent claim may nonetheless be found to infringe if there is ‘equivalence’ between 
the elements of the accused product or process and the claimed elements of the patented invention.” Warner-
Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997). 
 56. This example assumes that Babcock & Wilcox could not obtain another, broader claim covering a 
catalyst relocated into the fabric baghouse based on the first patent application. 
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One way the original applicant can be at fault for supplementary innovation 
is by filing the original patent application too early—that is, before the applicant 
is far enough along in the innovation process to obtain valid patent claims. For 
example, to be patentable, an invention must have “utility.”57 The threshold for 
satisfying the utility requirement is very low for many areas of technology, but 
the requirement can be meaningful for some innovation, particularly in the life 
sciences.58 If the original application discloses an invention but fails to establish 
its utility—for example, the application describes a new drug compound but 
does not include sufficient preclinical evidence of its therapeutic effect—the 
invention will not be validly patentable in the original application.59 If the 
original patent applicant then carries out new research that establishes utility and 
tries to file a new application claiming the same invention, the original 
application will anticipate the new claims.60 In this scenario, the original patent 
applicant is at fault for rendering the deepening supplementary innovation 
unpatentable. 
A similar situation arises when an original application fails to meet the 
“enablement” requirement—the requirement that a patent application must 
enable a person skilled in the art to make and use the invention.61 If the original 
application discloses the broad strokes of an invention but does not provide 
enough information to adequately enable it, the invention will not be validly 
patentable in that original application. But if the original applicant later figures 
out the enabling details and files a new patent application, the new application’s 
claims are likely to be rejected as anticipated by the original application’s 
disclosure.62 
In both of these examples of at-fault supplementary innovation, the 
supplementary innovation should not have been post-filing innovation at all; the 
original patent applicant should have waited to file its first application. In 
 
 57. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1369–72 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The utility requirement is based in 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101’s language that inventors can obtain patents for “useful” inventions. See id. at 1370; 35 U.S.C. § 101 
(2018). For more extensive discussion of the utility requirement, see, for example, Michael Risch, Reinventing 
Usefulness, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1195 (2010), and Sean B. Seymore, Making Patents Useful, 98 MINN. L. REV. 
1046 (2014). 
 58. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1644–46 
(2003). 
 59. See Roin, supra note 18, at 522–23. 
 60. See In re Hafner, 410 F.2d 1403, 1405 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (“[A] disclosure lacking [utility] is . . . entirely 
adequate to anticipate a claim . . . and, at the same time, entirely inadequate to support the allowance of such a 
claim.”); Roin, supra note 18, at 522. 
 61. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 735 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 62. A prior art application’s nonenabling disclosure should not, in theory, have this effect because 
anticipating prior art must not only disclose the claimed invention but also enable it. Schering Corp. v. Geneva 
Pharm., 339 F.3d 1373, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2003). However, during examination by the USPTO, the burden is 
on the applicant to rebut a presumption of enablement. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 
1313, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003). This presumption is hard to overcome, see Sean B. Seymore, Reinvention, 92 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1031, 1059–60 (2017), and especially so for the original patent applicant. In practice, an 
applicant will usually avoid arguing that its own application is nonenabling. Cf. Nathan T. Lewis, Scott W. 
Hackwelder & Peter D. Siddoway, Considerations for Handling Closely Related Subject Matter in Patent 
Portfolios in Light of Therasense and the America Invents Act of 2011, 53 IDEA 63, 91 (2013) (“[A] patent 
prosecutor should take all reasonable measures to avoid arguing against a client’s own prior art.”). 
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contrast, in “no-fault” supplementary innovation, there is no clear error by the 
original patent applicant in its first application; the first application describes its 
claimed invention sufficiently to be validly patentable. The exact line between 
at-fault and no-fault supplementary innovation is blurry. But it is nonetheless 
worth recognizing that the original patent applicant may be more or less culpable 
for post-filing innovation’s unpatentability. 
For each type of supplementary innovation, whether minor or deepening, 
encompassed or broadening, no-fault or at-fault, a new patent application 
specifically claiming the supplementary innovation should as a general rule be 
unpatentable in view of the original application. But concerns about the resulting 
limitations on innovators have driven changes to the patent system. These 
changes grant preferential treatment to original patent applicants such that they 
can sometimes—but not always—patent this otherwise unpatentable innovation. 
I turn to the historical development of these changes next. 
II.  THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT 
The law creating preferential treatment for original patent applicants has 
developed piecemeal over time. As Congress has sought to adapt the patent 
system to better accommodate collaborative research and development, the law 
has gradually shifted toward favoring original patent applicants over other 
follow-on innovators, while also expanding who qualifies as an original patent 
applicant. 
A.  PATENT ACT OF 1952 
The Patent Act of 195263 provided the basic statutory structure for novelty 
and nonobviousness until the passage of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act 
(AIA) in 2011.64 Section 102 of the 1952 Act set forth categories of “prior art” 
that rendered an invention unpatentable.65 Most importantly for the discussion 
here, the invention was rendered unpatentable if it was “patented . . . [(a)] before 
the invention thereof . . . [or (b)] more than one year prior to the date of the 
application for patent,” “(e) . . . described in a patent granted on an application 
for patent by another filed . . . before the invention thereof,” or “(g) . . . before 
[the] invention thereof . . . made . . . by another who had not abandoned, 
suppressed, or concealed it;” or if the person applying for the patent “(f) . . . did 
not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented.”66 Section 103 of the 
Act then specified that even if “the invention is not identically disclosed or 
 
 63. Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, 66 Stat. 792 (1952). 
 64. Cf. Merges, supra note 4 (describing priority and novelty under the AIA as compared to under the 
Patent Act of 1952). 
 65. See In re Harry, 333 F.2d 920, 924 n.2 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (discussing the term “prior art”). While statute 
forms the basis of what is prior art, many of the nuances are created by courts and are not discernable from the 
statute. See Mark A. Lemley, Does “Public Use” Mean the Same Thing It Did Last Year?, 93 TEX. L. REV. 
1119, 1134 (2015); Merges, supra note 4, at 1033–34. 
 66. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1958) (emphasis added). 
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described as set forth in section 102 of this title,” it was not patentable if it was 
obvious in light of the prior art.67 
In this early form, a narrowly defined group of original patent applicants 
received some preferential treatment allowing them to patent supplementary 
innovation. This preferential treatment arose from the language “by another” in 
§ 102(e).68 As a result of this language, original patent applicants, but not others, 
could patent supplementary innovation that occurred before the original 
application was issued as a granted patent, as long as the original applicant filed 
the new application within a year of the original application’s issuance and there 
was no other prior art rendering the new application’s claims unpatentable.69 
Because of this favored treatment for original patent applicants, where the 
line was drawn between them and others by the language “by another” was 
significant. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), the Federal 
Circuit’s predecessor court,70 grappled with where to draw this line in a pair of 
cases in the 1960s. The cases stemmed from a series of applications on film 
technology owned by Polaroid Corporation, “all flow[ing] from the same 
research out of the same laboratory.”71 Three different inventors’ work was 
reflected in the applications; on some applications they were solo inventors, and 
on some applications two of the three were joint inventors.72 At issue in both 
cases was whether the earlier-filed solo-inventor patents were “by another” with 
respect to the later-filed joint-inventor applications. If they were, the solo-
inventor patents would be prior art against the joint-inventor applications.73 
 
 67. Id. § 103. 
 68. Section 102(g) was also limited to “by another,” but that subsection was originally only invoked in 
particular disputes between rival applicants both claiming the same invention, called “interferences.” The text 
accompanying notes 81–92 addresses § 102(g)’s role in preferential treatment. 
 69. This was because under § 102(e), an earlier-filed and ultimately granted application “by another” was 
prior art to a later-filed application if the earlier-filed application was filed before the invention of the later-filed 
application’s invention. In contrast, the original applicant’s own earlier-filed application (that is, not “by 
another”) did not quality as prior art under § 102(e). Therefore, the original applicant’s own earlier-filed 
application was prior art to its later-filed application only if the earlier-filed application issued as a granted patent 
before the later-filed application’s invention (§ 102(a) prior art); or if the earlier-filed application was issued as 
a granted patent more than a year before the later-filed application was filed (§ 102(b) prior art). See 35 U.S.C. 
§ 102 (1958).  
  Because § 102 contained various geographic restrictions with respect to the origin of prior art, see 35 
U.S.C. § 102 (1958), preferential treatment was more complex when applications were filed and/or innovation 
originated outside the United States. These complexities, in their original form and as they were amended over 
time, go beyond the scope of this Article. This Article assumes throughout that original and later patent 
applications are filed in the United States, and that innovation takes place in the United States. 
 70. Marion T. Bennett, The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit—Origins, in THE 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT: A HISTORY 1982–1990, at 1, 7 (1991). The 
Federal Circuit now has exclusive appellate jurisdiction of appeals from “a final decision of a district court . . . in 
any civil action arising under, or in any civil action in which a party has asserted a compulsory counterclaim 
arising under, any Act of Congress relating to patents or plant variety protection” and from “a decision of the 
Patent Trial and Appeal Board of the United States Patent and Trademark Office with respect to a patent 
application.” 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2018). 
 71. In re Land, 368 F.2d 866, 878 (C.C.P.A. 1966). 
 72. See id. at 868; In re Blout, 333 F.2d 928, 929–30 (C.C.P.A. 1964). 
 73. See Land, 368 F.2d at 875–81; Blout, 333 F.2d at 931. 
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In In re Blout in 1964, the CCPA held that one of the earlier-filed solo-
inventor patents was “not ‘another’ to” a later-filed joint-inventor application.74 
Yet, two years later, in In re Land, the court held the opposite: that two of the 
earlier-filed solo-inventor patents were both “by another” with respect to a later-
filed joint-inventor application.75 The decision in Land meant that the innovator 
team from an original patent application could patent its own supplementary 
innovation that occurred before the original patent application issued (subject to 
any other prior art).76 But if the supplementary innovation involved any new 
individual, or if it did not involve even a single original team member, the 
supplementary innovation was unpatentable.77 
This required companies to be very careful about the timing and content of 
their patent applications. A contemporary commentator described: 
  With the increasing complexity of modern research and development, it 
frequently happens that a single project spawns several inventions. Such 
projects usually require a group effort, and the resulting inventions are not all 
contributed by the same “inventive entity.” . . . If the attorney proceeds in 
what would seem to be a normal manner, and files several applications over a 
period of time, then the provision of 35 USC 102 (e) is likely to be used to 
 
 74. See Blout, 333 F.2d at 931. 
 75. See Land, 368 F.2d at 881. The court addressed the apparent inconsistency with Blout in a footnote, 
stating that “[o]n reconsidering our opinion in [Blout], wherein it was remarked that ‘Rogers is not ‘another’ to 
Blout and Rogers,’ we now think that remark to have been unfortunate.” Id. at 879 n.10. The court explained 
that the “true basis” of its decision in Blout was that the solo-inventor Rogers patent included description of joint 
work by Blout and Rogers. Id. The description of the joint work, contained within Rogers’ solo patent, was not 
“by another” with respect to the Blout and Rogers joint-inventor patent. See id.  
  A different but related fact pattern was recently addressed in Duncan Parking Technologies, Inc. v. IPS 
Group, Inc., in which the Federal Circuit held that an earlier-filed patent naming King and Schwarz as inventors 
anticipated a later-filed patent naming King and three others as inventors. See Duncan Parking Tech., Inc. v. IPS 
Group, Inc., 914 F.3d 1347, 1352–53, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 2019). There the Federal Circuit, like the CCPA’s 
reconsideration of Blout in Land, considered the origin of the specific anticipating disclosure in the earlier-filed 
patent. See id. at 1357–59. The court stated, citing Land, that “[i]f Schwarz is a joint inventor of the anticipating 
disclosure, then it is ‘by another’ for the purposes of § 102(e).” Id. at 1357 (citing Land, 368 F.2d at 879).  
 76. Cf. Land, 368 F.2d at 877 (“There appears to be no dispute as to the law that A is not ‘another’ as to 
A, B is not ‘another’ as to B, or even that A & B are not ‘another’ as to A & B.”). 
 77. As the Federal Circuit made clear in Duncan Parking, the analysis under pre-AIA law is not simply a 
comparison of listed inventors, but rather a comparison of the inventors of the later-filed application with the 
innovators making sufficient contributions to the relevant content in the original application. See Duncan 
Parking, 914 F.3d at 1358 (“[T]o decide whether a reference patent is ‘by another’ for the purposes of 35 U.S.C. 
§ 102(e), the Board must (1) determine what portions of the reference patent were relied on as prior art . . . , (2) 
evaluate the degree to which those portions were conceived ‘by another,’ and (3) decide whether that other 
person’s contribution is significant enough, when measured against the full anticipating disclosure, to render 
him a joint inventor of the applied portions of the reference patent.”). A discrepancy between inventorship and 
contribution to the disclosure of a patent application can occur because inventorship is based the application’s 
claims. Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 116(a) (2018) (“Inventors may apply for a patent jointly even though . . . each did not 
make a contribution to . . . every claim.”); 37 C.F.R. § 1.48 (2018) (describing the procedures for correcting or 
changing inventorship, for example due to “cancelation of claims in the application”); Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. 
Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“A contribution to one claim is enough.”). Thus, an 
individual can contribute to the original patent application’s disclosure without being an inventor, and 
conversely, an inventor may not have contributed to all of the disclosure in the application. 
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reject the later filed applications on the disclosure of a patent issued on one or 
more of the earlier filed applications.78 
The constraints on patenting team-based research and development 
increased considerably in 1973, when the CCPA held in In re Bass that the 
invention of a company’s earlier-filed patent “by another” was available as prior 
art against the company’s later-filed application for demonstrating obviousness 
if the patent’s invention was invented before the application’s invention—even 
if the patent was filed after the application’s invention.79 Bass thus suggested 
that delaying the first application’s filing would no longer prevent that 
application from potentially rendering later innovation unpatentable.80 
In reaching this conclusion, the court in Bass relied on § 102(g), which 
precluded a patent on an invention that had been “made . . . by another who had 
not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it” before the applicant’s invention.81 
Previously, the CCPA had only considered § 102(g) in the context of particular 
disputes between rival applicants both claiming the same invention.82 Yet the 
court in Bass departed from this limitation on § 102(g) and allowed it to be 
considered in a context unrelated to such a dispute.83 
These decisions set up a challenging situation for companies engaged in 
team-based research and development. Under the “all-claims” rule applied by 
some courts, companies were required to file different teams’ inventions in 
 
 78. Bernard E. Franz, Prosecution Problems with a Plurality of Inventions from a Single Project, 51 J. 
PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 559, 559 (1969) (footnote omitted); see also Donald G. Daus, New and Unobvious Changes to 
U.S. Patent Law, 3 INTELL. PROP. J. 71, 78 (1987) (stating, with respect to “the concept of ‘another’,” that 
“[p]roblems arise most frequently with rejection under section 102(e),” and that to “avoid the pitfalls the word 
‘another’ caused, solicitors would file applications for closely related inventions with different entities on the 
same day”). 
 79. See In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276, 1277, 1281, 1286–87 (C.C.P.A. 1973). 
 80. The Bass court was split such that the tiebreaking opinion “established the court’s narrow precedent 
and essentially limited Bass’ approval of a § 102(g) / § 103 rejection to the facts of that case,” Andrew C. 
Michaels, Pot Calls the Kettle Dictum: Expanded Secret Prior Art in Obviousness, 26 FED. CIR. B.J. 93, 95 
(2016), circumstances “which include the disclosure of such invention in an issued patent.” Bass, 474 F.2d at 
1307 (Lane, J., concurring). 
 81. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1958). 
 82. See Bass, 474 F.2d at 1283; Peter J. Shurn III, Is the Invention of Another Available as Prior Art? In 
Re Bass to In re Clemens and Beyond, 63 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 516, 518–19 (1981). This particular type of dispute 
was called an “interference.” See 35 U.S.C. § 135 (1958); Bass, 474 F.2d at 1283. The limitation to interferences 
was consistent with legislative history. See Bass, 474 F.2d at 1298–99 (Baldwin, J., concurring); Shurn, supra, 
at 518–19. 
 83. See Bass, 474 F.2d at 1283–87. Three years earlier, the Seventh Circuit had similarly concluded that 
an earlier-invented but later-filed patent could be prior art under § 102(g), and could be used to establish 
obviousness, outside the context of an interference. See Sutter Products Co. v. Pettibone Mulliken Corp., 428 
F.2d 639, 644–46 (7th Cir. 1970); see also Bass, 474 F.2d at 1286.  
  The CCPA later in In re Clemens appeared to limit Bass to situations in which one of the application’s 
inventors or the public had knowledge of the earlier invention when making the application’s later invention. 
See In re Clemens, 622 F.2d 1029, 1039–40 (C.C.P.A. 1980). The Federal Circuit subsequently dismissed 
Clemens’ discussion of a knowledge requirement as dictum, see Tyco Healthcare Grp. v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, 
774 F.3d 968, 976 (Fed. Cir. 2014); E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petro. Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1437 
(Fed. Cir. 1988), although it is not clear that the characterization as dictum was correct. See Michaels, supra 
note 80.  
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separate patent applications.84 Yet, filing a patent application on an invention by 
one team could undermine the patentability of an invention by another team. 
Indeed, one of the concurring opinions in Bass critiqued its result, arguing that 
it was at odds with collaborative, iterative innovation, and that it could push 
companies to rely on trade secrets instead of patents.85 A contemporary article 
in the Journal of the Patent Office Society similarly described that “it is not 
surprising that Bass has evoked a loud cry from industry, especially the larger 
corporations whose typical research and development situation involves a group 
of technical people working on the same general program.”86 
B.  PATENT LAW AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1984 
In 1984, Congress enacted amendments to the Patent Act in response to the 
problems that had developed over the preceding decades.87 The Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary’s report described that the bill changed “a complex 
body of case law which discourages communication among members of research 
teams working in corporations, universities or other organizations.”88 
First, the amendments allowed for joint inventorship of a patent application 
even when not every joint inventor had contributed to every claim.89 This 
allowed a single application to contain claims invented by different groups of 
inventors.90 
Second, in response to Bass, 35 U.S.C. § 103 was amended to add the 
following language: 
 
 84. Gregory N. Mandel, Left-Brain versus Right-Brain: Competing Conceptions of Creativity in 
Intellectual Property Law, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 283, 293 (2010); see, e.g., In re Sarett, 327 F.2d 1005, 1010 
n.7 (C.C.P.A. 1964). 
 85. See Bass, 474 F.2d at 1304 (Baldwin, J., concurring) (“Most [inventions] are the result of carefully 
planned scientific research, often with numerous persons working on various aspects of a given problem. 
Invention is often reached via a large number of small steps forward. Given the possibility that the special 
knowledge of the inventor’s coworkers developed during the pursuance of the invention would be usable against 
any patent based on the invention which is the end result of the research effort, investors and corporate 
management would, or should, be most wary of using the patent system to protect any commercially valuable 
invention, rather than following the trade secret route.”). 
 86. Harris A. Pitlick, A Proposed Compromise to the “Prior Art” Controversy Surrounding In Re Hellsund 
and In Re Bass, 56 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 699, 708–09 (1974). The outcome of Bass was also particularly 
objectionable to American companies because § 102(g) prior art was limited to earlier inventions “made in this 
country.” See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1958). Bass thus advantaged foreign companies over domestic ones; the same 
commentator suggested that “[i]t is thus foreseeable that if Bass is rigorously followed, those American 
companies in industries where patents are important which are wealthy enough to move all or part of their 
research and development capabilities outside the United States may well do so.” Pitlick, supra, at 709. 
 87. See Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, 98 Stat. 3383 (1984). 
 88. S. REP. NO. 98-663, at 7 (1984); accord Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, H.R. 6286, 98th Cong., 
130 CONG. REC. 28071 (1984) (enacted). 
 89. See Patent Law Amendments Act § 104, 98 Stat. at 3384–85 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 116); Daus, supra 
note 78, at 73–74; Mandel, supra note 84, at 293–94. 
 90. The Senate Report described that the amendment “recognizes the realities of modern team research. A 
research project may include many inventions. Some inventions may have contributions made by individuals 
who are not involved in other, related inventions.” S. REP. NO. 98-663, at 8; accord H.R. 6286, 98th Cong., 130 
CONG. REC. 28071. 
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  Subject matter developed by another person, which qualifies as prior art 
only under subsection (f) or (g) of section 102 of this title, shall not preclude 
patentability under this section where the subject matter and the claimed 
invention were, at the time the invention was made, owned by the same person 
or subject to an obligation of assignment to the same person.91 
Thus, overriding Bass, the amendment excluded commonly owned § 102(g) 
prior art from analysis under § 103.92 The result was that a company could avoid 
having its earlier invention render its later invention unpatentable by waiting to 
file a patent application on the earlier invention until after the later invention 
took place.93 The Senate Report described that the amendment would 
“encourage communication among members of research teams, and lead to more 
public dissemination through patents.”94 
In creating this safe harbor, however, Congress made clear that it intended 
a quid pro quo of patent scope for term through the expansion of double 
patenting doctrine.95 Double patenting was an existing doctrine that prevented 
(and still prevents) a patentee from “obtaining a time-wise extension of patent 
for the same invention or an obvious modification thereof.”96 The doctrine 
predated the Patent Act of 1952,97 but its core elements were filled in largely 
during the 1960s and early 1970s.98 In this period, the CCPA first approved of 
allowing a patent applicant to overcome obviousness-type double patenting—
double patenting in which the claims of one patent are obvious in view of the 
claims of the other—by filing a “terminal disclaimer.”99 In a terminal disclaimer, 
the patentee agrees that one patent will expire no later than the other.100 
 
 91. See Patent Law Amendments Act § 103, 98 Stat. at 3384; S. REP. NO. 98-663, at 7 (referring to Bass 
and Clemens). The USPTO’s guidelines interpreted “person” to include “organization,” and “owned by the same 
person” to require that “the same person, persons, or organization own 100% of the subject matter (prior art) and 
100% of the claimed invention.” PTO’s Initial Guidelines as to Implementation of Patent Law Amendments, 
reprinted in 29 BNA’S PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 214, 214 (1984). 
 92. See infra Part II.C.1 addressing the inclusion of § 102(f) in the amendment. 
 93. If the company filed the patent application on the earlier invention before the later invention took place, 
the earlier-filed application would be prior art under § 102(e) upon issuance unless it was not “by another.” See 
35 U.S.C. § 102(e) (1988). 
 94. S. REP. NO. 98-663, at 7; accord H.R. 6286, 98th Cong., 130 CONG. REC. 28071. 
 95. Donald G. Daus, Double Patenting: More Is Not Always Better, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 
740, 740 (1991) (describing double patenting rejections as the “quid pro quo” for the new safe harbor). 
 96. In re Lonardo, 119 F.3d 960, 965 (Fed. Cir. 1997). More specifically, it bars a patentee from receiving 
two patents claiming identical subject matter (“statutory” double patenting) or two patents where the claims of 
one are obvious in view of the claims of the other (“non-statutory” or “obviousness-type” double patenting). 
Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186, 196–97 (1894); Sun Pharm. Indus., Ltd. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 611 F.3d 
1381, 1384–85 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 97. See Eagle Mfg., 151 U.S. at 196–97; U.S. PATENT OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE §§ 801–02 (1st ed. 1949). 
 98. See Daus, supra note 95, at 741. 
 99. See Sun Pharm., 611 F.3d at 1384–85; In re Robeson, 331 F.2d 610, 613–15 (C.C.P.A. 1964); Daus, 
supra note 95, at 744. 
 100. Cf. In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 894 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (describing that a terminal disclaimer “guarantee[s] 
that the second patent . . . expire[s] at the same time as the first patent”). Section 253 of the Patent Act allows a 
patentee or patent applicant to “disclaim or dedicate to the public the entire term, or any terminal part of the 
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With the 1984 amendments, Congress conveyed its expectation that the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) would expand double patenting 
doctrine to apply to claims in commonly owned applications to prevent “an 
organization from obtaining two or more patents with different expiration dates 
covering nearly identical subject matter.”101 Congress further conveyed its 
expectation that “double patenting rejections [resulting from the new safe 
harbor] can be overcome in certain circumstances by disclaiming the terminal 
portion of the term of the later patent, thereby eliminating the problem of 
extending patent life.”102 The USPTO subsequently issued guidance for 
examiners, and then promulgated rules, such that a double patenting rejection 
could be made based on a commonly owned patent with different or partially 
overlapping inventorship, and that when the rejection was an obviousness-type 
double patenting rejection, it could be overcome by filing a terminal 
disclaimer.103 
Thus, the 1984 amendments and accompanying expansion of double 
patenting set out two important policy positions with respect to preferential 
treatment. The first was that, to accommodate collaborative innovation, some 
preferential treatment should be based on ownership, rather than being restricted 
to specific groups of inventors. The amendments made some preferential 
treatment available for different groups of inventors within a single organization, 
as well as for collaborations between different organizations, provided that the 
organizations put the appropriate assignment agreements in place.104 The second 
was that preferential treatment should be limited to additional patent scope but 
not term: that is, the amendments allowed an original patent applicant to receive 
multiple patents on similar inventions, as long as this did not result in longer 
patent protection. 
C.  AIPA OF 1999 AND CREATE ACT OF 2004 
Preferential treatment for original patent applicants was further changed by 
amendments to the Patent Act in 1999 and 2004. Some of the changes were the 
result of amendments specifically intended to expand eligibility; others were the 
result of amendments to other provisions that had indirect effects. 
 
term, of the patent granted or to be granted.” 35 U.S.C. § 253 (1958); 35 U.S.C. § 253 (2018). See supra Part 
IV.B.1 for further discussion of terminal disclaimers to overcome obviousness-type double patenting. 
 101. S. Rep. No. 98-663, at 8 (1984); accord Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, H.R. 6286, 98th Cong., 
130 CONG. REC. 28071 (1984) (enacted). 
 102. S. Rep. No. 98-663, at 8; accord H.R. 6286, 98th Cong., 130 CONG. REC. 28071. 
 103. Longi, 759 F.2d at 895; PTO’s Initial Guidelines, supra note 91, at 214; 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(d) (1985); 
Final Rules for Miscellaneous Patent Provisions, 50 Fed. Reg. 9368, 9381 (Mar. 7, 1985) (to be codified at 37 
C.F.R. pt. 1). 
 104. H.R. REP. NO. 108-425, at 3–4 (2004). 
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1.  Expanding the Safe Harbor under § 103 
The 1999 and 2004 amendments to the Patent Act further broadened the 
scope of applicants falling into the favored group. First, the American Inventors 
Protection Act of 1999 (AIPA) expanded the 1984 safe harbor (which in 1995 
had been designated as § 103(c)105) to include § 102(e) prior art.106 That is, the 
amended language of the § 103(c) safe harbor read: 
Subject matter developed by another person, which qualifies as prior art only 
under one or more of subsections (e), (f), and (g) of section 102 of this title, 
shall not preclude patentability under this section where the subject matter and 
the claimed invention were, at the time the invention was made, owned by the 
same person or subject to an obligation of assignment to the same person.107 
After the amendment, the original patent application’s owner could patent 
its own minor supplementary innovation that occurred while the original patent 
application was still secret, regardless of inventorship (subject to any other prior 
art).108 As a result, the difficulties associated with In re Land’s interpretation of 
“by another” were eliminated for minor supplementary innovation (but not 
deepening supplementary innovation) when research and development took 
place within a single organization, or across multiple organizations with 
appropriate assignment agreements.109 This change was significant; at the time, 
some practitioners counseled clients to refile certain pending applications to take 
advantage of the broadened eligibility for preferential treatment.110 
Eligibility for preferential treatment was further expanded in 2004. The 
expansion was in response to the Federal Circuit’s decision in OddzOn Products, 
Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc.,111 in which the court held that confidential disclosures to 
 
 105. See Pub. L. No. 104-41, § 1, 109 Stat. 351, 351 (1995). 
 106. See American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 4807(a), 113 Stat. 1501A-552, 
1501A-591 (1999). 
 107. Id. 
 108. That is, a commonly owned, earlier-filed application could only be a basis for nonobviousness if it 
became publicly available before the invention of the later-filed application’s claimed invention, or more than a 
year before the later application’s filing. Once the earlier-filed application was publicly available, it became 
prior art under § 102(a) or § 102(b) as “patented or described in a printed publication.” See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)–
(b) (2000). 
 109. Under U.S. law, inventors generally initially own the patent rights in their inventions, Bd. of Trs. of the 
Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. 776, 785–86 (2011), but inventors who 
generate inventions in the course of their employment will typically assign those inventions to their employer, 
as required under their employment agreement. Cf. id. 
 110. See, e.g., Gregory J. Maier & Philippe Signore, Pardon Our Dust: US Patent Law under Renovation, 
MANAGING INTELL. PROP., May 2001, at 23, 26; Michael R. McGurk, Rebecca M. McNeill & Charles E. Van 
Horn, Report: The American Investors Protection Act of 1999, FINNEGAN (Dec. 1999) (on file with author). By 
filing a continuing application based on the pending application, a patent applicant could take advantage of the 
broadened eligibility without losing the pending application’s priority date. See American Inventors Protection 
Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 4807(b), 113 Stat. 1501A-552, 1501A-591 (1999) (“The amendment made 
by this section shall apply to any application for patent filed on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.”); 
infra note 180 and accompanying text. 
 111. OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396 (Fed. Cir. 1997); H.R. REP. NO. 108-425, at 2 
(2004). 
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the inventor were available as prior art to render an invention obvious.112 The 
court concluded that the confidential disclosures were prior art under § 102(f), 
which prevented granting a patent to a person who “did not himself invent the 
subject matter sought to be patented,” and that § 102(f) prior art was available 
for establishing obviousness under § 103.113 
The Federal Circuit felt the outcome was “inescapable” given the statutory 
language, but it invited Congress to correct it.114 The outcome was viewed as “a 
significant potential threat to inventors who engage in collaborative research and 
development projects,” and its “potential ‘chilling effect’ for communication 
and open collaboration . . . troubled many academics and researchers.”115 It was 
particularly problematic for public-private research partnerships.116 
Collaborative research and development efforts across multiple organizations 
could rely on the safe harbor as long as common ownership was established 
ahead of time.117 Public-sector organizations, however, were typically restricted 
in their ability to assign ownership; thus, public-private partnerships were 
disadvantaged as compared to private-private partnerships.118 
In 2004, Congress responded to OddzOn with the Cooperative Research 
and Technology Enhancement (CREATE) Act.119 The CREATE Act added 
language to § 103 specifying that work under joint research agreements would 
be treated as commonly owned.120 Structuring the amendment in this way meant 
that although OddzOn had related to § 102(f) prior art, eligibility for the safe 
harbor under § 103 was broadened for all three types of prior art it specified—
 
 112. See OddzOn, 122 F.3d at 1401–04. Two designs had been confidentially disclosed to the inventor of a 
design patent on a football-like ball. Id. at 1400. 
 113. See id. at 1402–04. 
 114. See id. at 1403. In Bass, the CCPA had stated in dicta that “[o]f course . . . [§ 102](f) ha[s] no relation 
to § 103 and no relevancy to what is ‘prior art’ under § 103.” In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276, 1290 (C.C.P.A. 1973). 
In OddzOn, however, the Federal Circuit reasoned that the Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984 had amended 
§ 103 to exclude § 102(f) prior art if it was commonly owned. Thus, § 103’s exclusion of § 102(f) prior art 
“under limited circumstances clearly implies that it is prior art otherwise.” OddzOn, 122 F.3d at 1403. The 
USPTO had taken a similar position in its initial guidelines for implementation of the 1984 amendments and in 
its regulations. PTO’s Initial Guidelines, supra note 91, at 214; 37 C.F.R. § 1.106(d) (1985). 
 115. H.R. REP. No. 108-425, at 5. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See id. at 3–4. 
 118. See id. at 5; cf. Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part I of II, 
21 FED. CIR. B.J. 435, 489 (2012) (describing that the CREATE Act was “enacted principally for the benefit of 
universities, many of whom face legal and institutional barriers to assigning their inventions to other entities”). 
 119. Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement (CREATE) Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-453, 
118 Stat. 3596; see H.R. REP. NO. 108-425, at 2 (describing the act as responding to OddzOn). 
 120. See CREATE Act § 2. A literal reading of the amendment seemed to say that any subject matter 
developed by another person (even if not a party to the joint research agreement) qualified for the safe harbor if 
the claimed invention was made under the agreement. See id. (“(2) . . . subject matter developed by another 
person and a claimed invention shall be deemed to have been owned by the same person or subject to an 
obligation of assignment to the same person if—(A) the claimed invention was made by or on behalf of parties 
to a joint research agreement that was in effect on or before the date the claimed invention was made; [and] 
(B) . . . was made as a result of activities undertaken within the scope of the joint research agreement . . . .”); 
Matal, supra note 118, at 487–88. However, the corrective language was read into the statute until it was added 
by the AIA. Matal, supra note 118, at 488. 
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that is, § 102(e), (f), and (g) prior art. The amendment thus expanded who could 
patent minor supplementary innovation. After the amendment, inventors 
working on commonly assigned projects or under joint research agreements 
could patent minor supplementary innovation that occurred while original 
applications were still secret (subject to any other prior art). 
As in 1984, Congress called upon double patenting to prevent any 
extension of patent term. The House Report stated that “[b]y enacting this 
legislation, Congress intends to extend this exemption . . . again subject to the 
same double patenting principles.”121 The Report specified that the doctrine of 
obviousness-type double patenting should apply to patents issued as a result of 
the CREATE Act, and that a terminal disclaimer could overcome such double 
patenting when appropriate.122 Again, the USPTO issued guidance and 
promulgated rules expanding the application of double patenting and terminal 
disclaimers accordingly.123 
2.  Pre-Grant Publication 
A second major change occurred as part of the AIPA in 1999. Though this 
change was not specifically intended to affect an original patent applicant’s 
ability to patent supplementary innovation, it ended up doing so indirectly. 
Before the AIPA, U.S. patent applications were secret until issuance as a 
granted patent.124 The AIPA amended 35 U.S.C. § 122 such that patent 
applications began to be published eighteen months from their priority date, 
subject to certain exceptions.125 Section 102(e) was correspondingly amended to 
include as prior art not only “a patent granted on an application for patent by 
another” filed before invention, but also “an application for patent, published 
under section 122(b), by another” filed before invention.126 
 
 121. H.R. REP. NO. 108-425, at 6. 
 122. See id. 
 123. See OFF. OF PAT. LEGAL ADMIN., EXAMINER CHECKLIST FOR PRIOR ART EXCLUSIONS UNDER 35 U.S.C. 
§ 103(C) AS AMENDED BY THE COOPERATIVE RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY ENHANCEMENT (CREATE) ACT 2 
(2005), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/exrchecklist.pdf; Changes to Implement the 
Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement Act of 2004, 70 Fed. Reg. 1818, 1820–21, 1823–24 (Jan. 
11, 2005) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1, 3) (interim rule); Changes to Implement the Cooperative Research 
and Technology Enhancement Act of 2004, 70 Fed. Reg. 54,259, 54,261–62 (Sept. 14, 2005) (to be codified at 
37 C.F.R. pt. 1, 3) (final rule). The interim rule added 37 C.F.R. § 1.109 setting forth guidelines for double 
patenting rejections, but the final rule removed § 1.109, and the double patenting guidelines were instead added 
to the Manual of Patenting Examining Procedure. See Changes to Implement the Cooperative Research and 
Technology Enhancement Act, 70 Fed. Reg. at 54,261. Section 1.321 setting forth terminal disclaimer 
requirements remained in the final rule. See id. at 54,262. 
 124. John R. Thomas, The American Inventors Protection Act of 1999: Overview and Analysis, in 6 INT’L 
INTELL. PROP. L. & POL’Y 13-1, 13-5 (Hugh C. Hansen ed., 2001); H.R. Rep. 106-287, at 32 (1999). 
 125. See American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 4502, 113 Stat. 1501A-552, 
1501A-561 (1999). The change took effect for applications filed on or after November 29, 2000. See id. § 4508; 
Press Release, USPTO, USPTO Will Begin Publishing Patent Applications (Nov. 27, 2000), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20150905092115/https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/uspto-will-begin-
publishing-patent-applications.  
 126. See American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 § 4505 (emphasis added). 
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Amendments to the Patent Act had, to this point, been toward expanded 
preferential treatment for original patent applicants, by excluding certain of their 
existing applications from obviousness analysis, and by broadening who was 
eligible. But application publication had the indirect—and seemingly 
overlooked127—effect of reduced preferential treatment. When patent 
applications were secret until issuance, an earlier-filed application only became 
prior art if it issued as a patent. If it was abandoned and never became a granted 
patent, it did not become prior art at all.128 Moreover, the original patent 
applicant could patent supplementary innovation invented before the original 
application issued (subject to any other prior art).129 After the institution of pre-
grant publication, this period for inventing supplementary innovation that could 
be patented, which this Article terms the “supplementation grace period,” ended 
with publication.130 Many supplementation grace periods were thus shorter than 
they would have been pre-AIPA.131 The practical impact, however, was 
attenuated by the pre-existing practice of patent application publication outside 
 
 127. My research has not revealed any discussion of this issue. Contemporary commentary discussed that 
publication would lead to earlier public disclosure of innovation, and that this was valuable to competitors, but 
not specifically that it was valuable to competitors because it put them on more equal ground with respect to 
supplementary innovation. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Hayden Gregory, Robert Rines, Herbert Wamsley & 
Douglas Wyatt, Early Patent Publication: A Boon or Bane? A Discussion on the Legal and Economic Effects of 
Publishing Patent Applications after Eighteen Months of Filing, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 601, 620 (1998). 
One explanation for the lack of contemporary discussion is that the practical effect of the amendment was limited 
for innovators who filed patent applications internationally. See infra note 133 and accompanying text. 
 128. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.108 (1988); MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 901.02 (5th ed., rev. 9, 
1988). Exceptions applied when an abandoned application was defensively published or was incorporated by 
reference into an issued patent; in those cases, the abandoned application was available to the public and could 
be prior art. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.108; MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra. 
 129. Since eligibility for preferential treatment differed between deepening and minor supplementary 
innovation, unless the innovation was not “by another,” only minor supplementary innovation, not deepening 
supplementary innovation, could be patented in this window (subject to any other prior art). See 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 102–103 (1994). 
 130. Again, unless the innovation was not “by another,” only minor supplementary innovation, but not 
deepening supplementary innovation, could be patented in this window (subject to any other prior art). See 35 
U.S.C. §§ 102–103 (2000). 
 131. Whereas publication was generally eighteen months from the priority date, 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1) 
(2000), the average time from filing to issuance or abandonment in fiscal year 2000 was twenty-five months. 
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2000, at 104 
(2000), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/about/stratplan/ar/USPTOFY2000PAR.pdf. The average time 
from priority date to issuance was likely significantly longer: the Uruguay Round Agreements Act had created 
provisional applications in 1995; as such, up to one year could elapse between a priority date based on a 
provisional application and the filing date for the first nonprovisional application in a patent family. Uruguay 
Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. 103-465, §§ 532, 534, 108 Stat. 4809, 4985–86, 4990 (1994). USPTO data also 
understated the relevant application pendencies in certain ways. See Dennis Crouch, Average Patent Application 
Pendency, PATENTLY-O (Dec. 12, 2011), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2011/12/average-patent-application-
pendency.html (discussing the treatment of requests for continued examination and the inclusion of continuing 
applications in USPTO pendency data). Average application pendency increased through the 2000s but has been 
decreasing since. See Dennis Crouch, Pendency of US Patent Applications, PATENTLY-O (Nov. 6, 2016), 
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/11/pendency-patent-applications.html.  
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the United States132 and the ability of some patent applicants to opt out of 
publication.133 
D.  AMERICA INVENTS ACT OF 2011 
The passage of the AIA in 2011 significantly altered the structure of 
§§ 102–103 of the Patent Act.134 At a high level, it maintained the preferential 
treatment for original patent applicants that had developed over the preceding 
years. But the restructuring under the AIA introduced several changes to the 
patentability of original patent applicants’ post-filing innovation. 
Post-AIA § 102 does not have provisions corresponding to pre-AIA 
§ 102(f) and (g),135 but it does contain a provision analogous to pre-AIA 
§ 102(e). Post-AIA § 102(a) states that “[a] person shall be entitled to a patent 
unless”: 
(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or 
in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective 
filing date of the claimed invention; or 
(2) the claimed invention was described in a patent issued . . . or in an 
application for patent published or deemed published . . . in which the patent 
or application, as the case may be, names another inventor and was effectively 
filed before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.136 
 
 132. International applications and most foreign applications were already being published before 1999. The 
original Patent Cooperation Treaty, signed in 1970, included a provision that international applications filed 
under the treaty would publish shortly after eighteen months from their earliest priority dates. See Patent 
Cooperation Treaty art. 21(2)(a), June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645. Almost all other countries also already 
published patent applications eighteen months after the priority date. See Duffy et al., supra note 127, at 602–
03. An application corresponding to a U.S. patent application filed in one of these jurisdictions would thus result 
in a publication eligible as prior art, even though the U.S. application was not itself published. See 35 U.S.C. 
§ 102(a)–(b) (1994). One contemporary commentator estimated that about eighty percent of patents filed in the 
United States in the early 1990s were available as publications (not necessarily in English) at eighteen months 
after the priority date. See Carlos J. Moorhead, Improving Our Patent System for a Stronger America, 11 ST. 
JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 465, 476 (1996). A more recent study found that about half of U.S. applications 
filed in 1996 through 1999 that ultimately became patents had corresponding foreign applications. See Stuart 
J.H. Graham & Deepak Hegde, Do Inventors Value Secrecy in Patenting? Evidence from the American 
Inventor’s Protection Act of 1999, at 22 (Dec. 2, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2170555. 
 133.  Section 122 allowed (and still allows) nonpublication requests if no corresponding application was 
filed in a jurisdiction publishing applications after eighteen months. See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(B) (2000); 35 
U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(B) (2018). Thus, an applicant who was eligible to and did file a nonpublication request was 
able to maintain the same supplementation grace period as before the implementation of pre-grant publication. 
 134. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). As before the AIA, 
post-AIA § 102 describes different categories of prior art and establishes the novelty requirement, and post-AIA 
§ 103 establishes the nonobviousness requirement. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103 (2018). 
 135. Dennis Crouch, With 102(f) Eliminated, Is Inventorship Now Codified in 35 U.S.C. 101? Maybe, but 
Not Restrictions on Patenting Obvious Variants of Derived Information, PATENTLY-O (Oct. 4, 2012), 
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/10/with-102f-eliminated-is-inventorship-now-codified-in-35-usc-101.html 
(discussing outstanding questions with respect to the elimination of section 102(f)); MANUAL OF PATENT 
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2151 (9th ed., rev. 2020) (discussing the elimination of sections 102(f) and (g)). 
 136. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2018) (emphasis added). 
 
February 2021] INNOVATION AND OWN PRIOR ART 591 
Post-AIA § 102(a)(2) is thus analogous to pre-AIA § 102(e) in that earlier-
filed, published applications and patents are prior art if they name “another 
inventor.”137 The Federal Circuit has not addressed the meaning of “names 
another inventor,” but the USPTO’s examination guidelines interpret “another 
inventor” to mean any difference in inventorship.138 Post-AIA § 102(a)(1) is 
analogous to pre-AIA § 102(a) in that applications and patents become prior art 
once published, regardless of whether they are the work of the original 
inventor(s) or not. 
The AIA also contains a provision analogous to pre-AIA § 103(c) that 
provides a safe harbor for commonly owned inventions and work under joint 
research agreements (which this Article refers to as the “common control” safe 
harbor). More specifically, post-AIA § 102(b)(2)(C) provides a carve-out from 
prior art under § 102(a)(2) when “the subject matter disclosed and the claimed 
invention, not later than the effective filing date of the claimed invention, were 
owned by the same person or subject to an obligation of assignment to the same 
person.”139 Post-AIA § 102(c) extends this carve-out to work under a joint 
research agreement.140 
Although these provisions are similar to their pre-AIA counterparts, there 
are several important differences. First, under pre-AIA law, the common control 
safe harbor was part of § 103, and thus applied only to minor supplementary 
innovation.141 In contrast, under the AIA, the common control safe harbor is 
found in § 102, thus applying to both deepening and minor supplementary 
innovation.142 
Second, under the AIA, the common control safe harbor applies if common 
control exists when the second application is filed.143 This is later than under 
pre-AIA law, where the safe harbor only applied if common control existed at 
the time of the second invention.144 These two differences expand preferential 
treatment for original patent applicants.145 
 
 137. Because the AIA converted the U.S. patent system to a first-to-file system, the relevant date for the 
claimed invention is its “effective filing date,” not its date of invention. Cf. Merges, supra note 4, at 1027–30 
(discussing these short-hand descriptors and explaining the complexities that are not captured by them). 
 138. See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 135, § 2154.01(c) (“[I]f there is any 
difference in inventive entity . . . the U.S. patent document satisfies the ‘names another inventor’ 
requirement . . . . [I]n the case of joint inventors, only one joint inventor needs to be different for the inventive 
entities to be different.”). 
 139. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(2)(C) (2018). 
 140. See id. § 102(c). 
 141. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) (2006). 
 142. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(2)(C)–(c) (2018). 
 143. See id. § 102(b)(2)(C) (requiring common ownership or an obligation of assignment “not later than the 
effective filing date of the claimed invention”). 
 144. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) (2006). 
 145. Cf. Rogers, supra note 18, at 377–78 (describing that post-AIA § 103(c) “increases the ability of 
pharmaceutical companies to prevent existing information from being considered prior art”); Dennis Crouch, 
Our Expanded Regime of Submarine Prior Art, PATENTLY-O (Apr. 22, 2015), https://patentlyo.com/patent/ 
2015/04/expanded-regime-submarine.html (describing the new exception as “more powerful” due in part to 
expansion to novelty). 
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A third difference increases the complexity of the supplementation grace 
period’s duration. This increased complexity derives from the differences 
between the pre-AIA and post-AIA one-year grace periods. Both pre-AIA and 
post-AIA §§ 102–103 provide(d) forms of a one-year grace period after a 
disclosure to file a patent application.146 Pre-AIA law provided the one-year 
grace period regardless of the disclosure’s origin, but the extra year was only for 
filing the later application; the invention still needed to occur before the 
disclosure.147 The one-year grace period thus did not change the supplementary 
innovation that could be patented (assuming timely filing). For a patent applicant 
qualifying for preferential treatment, any supplementation grace period extended 
until publication of the original application (or issuance if there was no pre-grant 
publication) and was unaffected by the one-year grace period.148 
Under post-AIA law, in contrast, when the one-year grace period applies, 
it can extend the supplementation grace period. Yet, the availability of the one-
year grace period is more limited: the AIA only provides it if there is a disclosure 
originating from an inventor.149 As a result, the supplementation grace period 
can have two possible lengths when it exists: it can extend until the original 
application’s publication (or issuance if there is no pre-grant publication); or, 
when the one-year grace period applies, the supplementation grace period can 
extend a year after the original application’s publication (or issuance). Notably, 
even when there is common control, the length of the supplementation grace 
period is variable depending on inventors’ contributions.150 This variability 
reintroduces dividing lines between inventor groups, even within common 
control, reminiscent of In re Land that had been largely eliminated for minor 
innovation through the amendments of 1984, 1999, and 2004.151 
Where does all of this historical layering of provisions regarding 
preferential treatment and reorganization under the AIA leave us? Broadly 
speaking, when a different party innovates beyond an original patent application, 
that innovation must almost always be both novel and nonobvious as compared 
 
 146. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b) (2006); 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1) (2018). This grace period is relatively unique 
to U.S. patent law. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 147. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). 
 148. When the original patent application was not “by another,” it did not qualify as prior art under § 102(e). 
See id. § 102(e). In that case, the original patent application was prior art against deepening and minor 
supplementary innovation that was invented after the original application’s publication or issuance (that is, a 
supplementation grace period until publication or issuance for both deepening and minor supplementary 
innovation). See id. § 102(a).  
  When the original patent application was “by another” but there was common control, it qualified as 
prior art under § 102(e), but the safe harbor of § 103(c) applied. See id. §§ 102(e), 103(c). The original 
application was thus prior art against deepening supplementary innovation that was invented after the original 
application’s filing (that is, no supplementation grace period for deepening supplementary innovation), see id. 
§ 102(e), and against minor supplementary innovation that was invented after the original application’s 
publication or issuance (that is, a supplementation grace period until publication or issuance for minor 
supplementary innovation). See id. § 102(a). 
 149. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1) (2018); Holbrook, supra note 2, at 1466–67. 
 150. See infra Part IV.A for a more detailed discussion of the supplementation grace period under the AIA. 
 151. See supra Part II.B, II.C. 
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to the original patent application to be patentable. The original patent applicant, 
however, is favored, such that it has the opportunity to protect post-filing 
innovation that a different party could not patent. In particular, the preferential 
treatment manifests as a supplementation grace period after the original 
application’s filing. During the supplementation grace period, a second 
application (which this Article refers to as a “supplementary application”152) 
does not need to be novel or nonobvious over the original application. Thus, 
during this period, eligible applicants can patent supplementary innovation that 
would otherwise be unpatentable. 
III.  PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT’S EFFECTS 
Though at least some form of preferential treatment for original patent 
applicants has long been a feature of the U.S. patent system, preferential 
treatment need not exist. Indeed, its scope varies around the world,153 and its 
existence has been the subject of international debate. In efforts to harmonize 
international patent laws beginning in the 1980s,154 one of the questions posed 
to the World Intellectual Property Organization committee tasked with writing 
a draft treaty was whether “pending patent applications of the same applicant 
[should] be excluded from the state of the art,”155 but no consensus was 
reached.156 
As Part II described, much of U.S. patent law’s expansion of preferential 
treatment for original patent applicants was driven by attempts to accommodate 
collaborative research and development. Put another way, the expansion was 
driven by the interests of innovators and organizations. But here I consider its 
 
 152. I have found one prior usage of this term in the same context. See Murashige, supra note 18, at 557 
n.32 (describing an earlier scholarly article as “discussing the self-collision rule and proposals regarding the time 
limit to file supplementary applications”) (citing Jochen Pagenberg, The WIPO Patent Harmonization Treaty, 
19 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 1 (1991)). 
 153. For example, European patent law has no preferential treatment for original patent applicants. 
However, European patent law excludes any unpublished application (regardless of whether it is the original 
applicant’s) for inventive step analysis. See EURO. PAT. OFF., GUIDELINES FOR EXAMINATION § 5.1 (2019) (“The 
state of the art also comprises the content of other European applications filed or validly claiming a priority date 
earlier than—but published . . . on or after—the date of filing . . . . Such earlier applications are part of the state 
of the art only when considering novelty and not when considering inventive step.”). Japanese patent law also 
excludes all unpublished applications from prior art for inventive step. But Japan has preferential treatment for 
original applicants: unpublished applications are also excluded from prior art for novelty if the inventor(s) or 
applicant(s) are identical between the two applications. See Japanese Patent Act, art. 29-2 (“Where an invention 
claimed in a patent application is identical with an invention or device (excluding an invention or device made 
by the inventor of the invention . . . ) . . . of another application . . . which has been filed prior to the date of 
filing . . . and published after . . . a patent shall not be granted . . . provided that this shall not apply where, at the 
time of the filing . . . the applicant . . . and the applicant of the other application . . . are the same person.”) 
(emphasis added).  
 154. Many parts of this effort ultimately stalled, but some harmonization was implemented, such as related 
to patent term and patentable technology areas. See Patent Law Harmonization, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., 
https://www.wipo.int/patent-law/en/patent_law_harmonization.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2021). 
 155. Thomas, supra note 18, at 160. 
 156. See id. at 162–63. 
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effects more broadly—can preferential treatment be justified as increasing 
innovation? 
Preferential treatment for original patent applicants creates the opportunity 
for original applicants to receive more exclusivity than they would otherwise. 
This exclusivity can be in the form of scope or term. Under current law, the term 
of a patent is a fixed period from the application’s filing date, subject to certain 
adjustments.157 Because a supplementary application will have a later filing date 
than the original application, any resulting supplementary patent will typically 
expire later.158 Thus, patenting supplementary innovation can delay the end of 
patent exclusivity. And when the innovation is broadening supplementary 
innovation,159 the additional exclusivity is also in the form of scope. 
Unlike most follow-on innovation, where the “right to patent 
improvements on a technology is a common right,”160 the additional term and/or 
scope of exclusivity available to the original patent applicant through a 
supplementary application is not available to others. Others can prevent the 
original patent applicant from obtaining the additional exclusivity by creating 
intervening prior art, but they cannot obtain patent rights to supplementary 
innovation.161 
Theories proposed to justify patent exclusivity generally can provide a 
framework for analyzing whether the additional exclusivity created by 
preferential treatment is likely to contribute to innovation. Two theories (both 
subject to much debate) are most commonly put forth to justify the patent 
system: the disclosure theory and the incentive theory.162 Under the disclosure 
theory, patents promote further innovation by disseminating existing innovation 
upon which the further innovation can be built.163 Under the incentive theory, 
 
 157. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2018). The term is twenty years from the application’s effective filing date, 
excluding provisional applications—that is, from the earliest nonprovisional application to which the application 
claims priority. See id. § 154(a). The twenty-year term is sometimes lengthened to account for delays within the 
USPTO (“patent term adjustment”) or premarket regulatory review (“patent term extension”), and/or shortened 
by terminal disclaimers. See id. § 154(b) (patent term adjustment); id. § 156 (patent term extension); id. § 253 
(disclaimers). Patents issuing from applications filed before June 8, 1995, had a term of seventeen years from 
issuance. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988); Mark A. Lemley, An Empirical Study of the Twenty-Year Patent Term, 
22 AIPLA Q.J. 369, 370 (1994). 
 158. See infra Part IV.B.1.a. 
 159. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 160. Duffy, supra note 16, at 488. 
 161. Another party who did not create intervening prior art but who used supplementary innovation 
commercially could have prior user rights. 35 U.S.C. § 273 provides a defense to infringement of a patent for a 
person who commercially used the invention in the United States at least a year before the patent’s filing date or 
a public disclosure by the patentee. See 35 U.S.C. § 273(a) (2018). 
 162. Kevin Emerson Collins, The Structural Implications of Inventors’ Disclosure Obligations, 69 VAND. 
L. REV. 1785, 1786 (2016); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. 
& TECH. 545, 554–61 (2012). 
 163. See J. Jonas Anderson, Nontechnical Disclosure, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1585–86 (2016); Ouellette, 
supra note 162, at 546. The benefit to others from patent disclosure has been widely questioned; some scholars 
critique disclosure theory itself, whereas others defend it but point to reasons why patent disclosures are not 
useful in their current form. See, e.g., Alan Devlin, The Misunderstood Function of Disclosure in Patent Law, 
23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401 (2010); Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539 (2009); Timothy 
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patent-based exclusivity incentivizes innovation. There are divergent views on 
how this works: one view is that the possibility of a patent as a reward 
incentivizes innovation occurring before the patent is awarded—what Mark 
Lemley has termed an “ex ante” justification for patents; another view is that 
patents incentivize later development or commercialization of inventions—what 
Professor Lemley has termed an “ex post” justification.164 Both the disclosure 
and incentive theories can frame considerations of the potential effects on 
innovation of the additional patent exclusivity generated by preferential 
treatment. 
A.  DISCLOSURE THEORY 
1.  Increased Disclosure of Supplementary Innovation 
Preferential treatment increases the disclosure of supplementary innovation 
via the patent system. Most patent applicants are incentivized to disclose their 
innovation via the patent system only if it is likely to be patentable. If they 
disclose unpatentable innovation in a patent application, the application’s 
publication will disclose the innovation to the public without the applicant 
receiving any exclusivity in return. Supplementary innovation is thus likely to 
be disclosed only when the original application is not prior art. Without any 
preferential treatment for original patent applicants, then, supplementary 
innovation would rarely be disclosed.165 Thus, preferential treatment encourages 
 
R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123 (2006); Seymore, supra note 24. Common 
criticisms include that the quality of patent disclosure is too low to be useful to other innovators and that 
innovation disclosed by patents would have been disclosed anyway—for example, through reverse engineering 
of the associated product. Ouellette, supra note 162, at 558, 560. Professor Ouellette has argued that the evidence 
that innovators use patent disclosures is stronger than others have suggested, and she and others have provided 
additional evidence of patents’ use as a source of technical information and of their role in cumulative innovation. 
See, e.g., id. at 561–80; Jeffrey L. Furman, Markus Nagler & Martin Watzinger, Disclosure and Subsequent 
Innovation: Evidence from the Patent Depository Library Program (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper 
No. 24660, 2018). Other scholars have argued that the value of patent disclosure is broader than as a source of 
technical information, and that patents allow for other valuable forms of disclosure. See, e.g., Anderson, supra; 
Chien, supra note 29; Jason Rantanen, Peripheral Disclosure, 74 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (2012). 
 164. See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 129, 130 (2004). The terminology for these theories varies. Some scholars, for example, use “incentive” 
theory to describe only the ex ante view and describe the ex post view as “commercialization” theory. See, e.g., 
Anderson, supra note 163, at 1581–89 (describing the three main patent theories as “the incentive to invent 
theory, the incentive to disclose theory, and the prospect or commercialization theory”); Camilla A. Hrdy, 
Commercialization Awards, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 13, 26 (2015) (describing the three traditional justifications for 
patents as generating incentives to “invent,” “disclose,” and “commercialize”). 
 165. Cf. Burk, supra note 29, at 1622 (“[T]he inventor’s understanding will likely advance, not just during 
the lifetime of the patent, but during the course of the patent application process. The best that can be done with 
incremental changes to the technology is to file continuations in part (‘CIPs’) . . . . But if the new discoveries or 
understanding are not themselves patentable, they will not be reflected in CIPs and will go undisclosed.”). But 
a valid patent is not the goal of every patent applicant. Some applicants hope simply to obtain a patent, regardless 
of whether it would likely be invalidated if later challenged. Even an invalid patent can still provide a competitive 
advantage, see infra note 176, and the USPTO regularly grants patents that could not or do not survive 
challenges. See Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation 
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original patent applicants to disclose this post-filing innovation in exchange for 
patent rights. 
Information about supplementary innovation can be valuable to other 
innovators. Because original patent applications are filed early in the innovation 
process, they usually do not describe complete, optimized inventions,166 often 
use “vague and general” language,167 and may not contain any explanation of 
how inventions work.168 Later innovation, including supplementary innovation, 
can fill in the details. This information can help others understand or 
successfully implement the invention and can help put others on more equal 
footing with original patent applicants with respect to developing subsequent 
innovation.169 
Disclosure of this information through supplementary applications can be 
particularly valuable when information about supplementary innovation is 
costly for others to obtain in other ways.170 For instance, deepening 
supplementary innovation explaining how an existing invention works may be 
costly for others to recreate, but also particularly valuable for fostering 
subsequent innovation.171 Moreover, without the possibility of patent protection 
afforded by preferential treatment, original patent applicants may choose to 
protect supplementary innovation through trade secrecy when they can.172 As 
 
Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 943, 944–46 (2004); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 
1495, 1500 (2001); R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2135, 
2145–46 (2009). Other patent applicants’ primary goal may not even be to obtain a patent. For example, filing 
a patent application can serve a signaling function to potential investors or acquirers. Cf. Simon, supra note 28, 
at 763 (describing the importance of patent protection to medical device startups in seeking investments, 
including “providing a useful signal to investors about . . . resource allocation and the experience and 
sophistication of the executive team”). Applicants may also file patent applications to create prior art against 
competitors’ inventions. See Gideon Parchomovsky, Publish or Perish, 98 MICH. L. REV. 926, 927–29 (2000) 
(arguing that firms sometimes engage in “preemptive publication” to adversely “affect the patentability of their 
rivals’ inventions by altering the state of the prior art”). But see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Promise and Perils 
of Strategic Publication to Create Prior Art: A Response to Professor Parchomovsky, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2358, 
2370 (2000) (arguing that “[i]t is implausible that rival pharmaceutical firms . . . would utilize preemptive 
publication,” and “[a]bsent evidence that commercial rivals are actually deploying the strategy that 
Parchomovsky attributes to them, it seems premature to fine-tune doctrine to take such a possibility into 
account”). 
 166. See supra notes 23–30 and accompanying text.  
 167. Cotropia, supra note 6, at 116–19. 
 168. See Seymore, supra note 51, at 719–21. 
 169. Cf. id. at 710 (“[I]t is easier to develop new drugs when researchers understand how old ones work.”). 
 170. Professor Ouellette has argued that “few inventions are ‘self-disclosing’ at zero cost,” pointing to the 
work of other scholars, including Jeanne Fromer and Alan Devlin. Ouellette, supra note 162, at 560–61. 
 171. See Seymore, supra note 51, at 710, 723–24 (discussing how disclosure of information about how an 
invention works would be “an enormous” public benefit, and how in cases of inventions with “opaque” 
mechanisms, “elucidating this information through reverse engineering is difficult, if not impossible (at least 
without considerable effort or expense)” and could involve experimentation that might require a license). 
 172. Cf. Duffy, supra note 13, at 366 (“[I]f pioneering patentees are denied improvement patents, the 
improvements may be maintained as trade secrets in situations where disclosure would be more socially 
beneficial.”). 
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others have noted, for example, post-filing innovation regarding the “best mode” 
of carrying out an invention is often held as a trade secret.173 
2.  Effects on Original Applications: Timing and Content 
Preferential treatment also affects the timing and content of the original 
application. This is because its timing and content are not fixed—they are 
influenced by an applicant’s knowledge that a later supplementary application 
can be filed. 
In particular, preferential treatment can encourage the original patent 
applicant to file its first application earlier, since the applicant knows that there 
is the opportunity for later supplementation. This can benefit others by leading 
to earlier public access to information about the innovation, as well as earlier 
expiration of the original patent.174  
But filing the original patent application earlier also shifts its content earlier 
along the innovation timeline. As a result, the original application’s disclosure 
may be less useful than it would have been without preferential treatment. Some 
of the information disclosed in a supplementary application may be information 
that, absent preferential treatment, would have been disclosed in the original 
application itself. Because the availability of preferential treatment does not 
differ between at-fault and no-fault supplementary innovation,175 in some cases 
preferential treatment may even encourage applicants to file their original 
applications before it is clear that the utility and disclosure requirements are met, 
in order to establish an early filing date. Relying on a supplementary application 
to correct any defects in an original application is risky but may still be a 
valuable strategy for some applicants.176 
 
 173. See W. Nicholson Price II, Expired Patents, Trade Secrets, and Stymied Competition, 92 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1611, 1618 (2017) (describing, with respect to keeping the best mode, including a subsequently 
discovered best mode, as a trade secret, that “[i]nventors know about and use this complementarity; law firms 
encourage it”). Patent applicants are required to disclose what the inventor believes is the “best mode” of carrying 
out the invention, 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2018), but only as of the date the patent application is filed. See Spectra-
Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The best mode requirement has been 
substantially weakened under the AIA: failure to disclose the best mode is not a basis for invalidity as a defense 
to patent infringement. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(3)(A) (2018); Brian J. Love & Christopher B. Seaman, Best Mode 
Trade Secrets, 15 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 8–11 (2012); Ryan Vacca, Patent Reform and Best Mode: A Signal to 
the Patent Office or a Step Toward Elimination?, 75 ALB. L. REV. 279, 290–93 (2012). 
 174. John Duffy has argued with respect to the prospect theory of patents, which favors early, broad patent 
rights, see infra notes 189–195 and accompanying text, that the “prospect features of the patent system are 
useful . . . because they channel rent-seeking behavior into . . . early patenting—which is socially desirable 
because it dissipates private but not social rents.” Duffy, supra note 16, at 464. As a result of early patenting, 
“the patent will expire sooner and, accordingly, more of the benefits associated with the invention will be 
captured by consumers rather than by the patentee.” Id. at 467. 
 175. See infra Part IV.A. 
 176. The supplementary application will have a later priority date. The risks thus include that the 
supplementary application’s patentability will be subject to others’ intervening prior art and the original 
applicant’s own non-patent disclosures; and that patent rights could be lost completely in foreign jurisdictions 
with absolute novelty rules. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. But filing an early original application 
can nonetheless play a strategic role, especially for patent applicants for whom the appearance of potential patent 
rights is more meaningful than valid granted rights. For example, even pending claims (that is, claims not 
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On the other hand, preferential treatment may also improve the quality of 
the original patent application’s disclosure. When original applicants cannot file 
patentable applications on post-filing innovation, they may try to use their 
existing applications to draft new claims covering the post-filing innovation. 
This is possible because the claims of a patent application define the boundaries 
of the exclusivity being sought by the patent applicant,177 but the application 
generally describes much more in its complete disclosure than the claims.178 
After filing, the disclosure cannot be changed, but the claims can be changed 
within the bounds of the disclosure.179 They can be changed either in the original 
application itself, or in a subsequent “continuing” application, which is treated 
as having the same filing date as the original.180 
Original patent applicants can thus use their existing applications to draft 
new claims to patent post-filing innovation, as long as the claims are sufficiently 
supported.181 Although commentators have critiqued such “mining” of claims 
(primarily in the context of claims to cover competitors),182 the Federal Circuit 
has made clear that applicants are free to pursue any claim with sufficient 
support in the disclosure as filed, even if the real genesis of the claim post-dates 
filing.183 
 
approved by the USPTO) can be valuable to the applicant and detrimental to a competitor when seeking funding. 
Cf. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical 
Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 699 (1998) (“[F]irms raise capital on the basis of the inchoate rights preserved by 
patent filings. In effect, each potential patent creates a specter of rights that may be larger than the actual rights, 
if any, eventually conferred by the PTO. Worked into the calculations of both risk-taking investors and risk-
averse product developers, these overlapping patent filings may compound the obstacles to developing new 
products.”). Similarly, if a patent is listed in the Orange Book as covering a drug product or method of using 
it—regardless of whether the claims are valid—approval from the FDA for generic versions can be delayed. See 
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2018); Feldman, supra note 40, at 600; Dmitry Karshtedt, The More Things 
Change: Improvement Patents, Drug Modifications, and the FDA, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1129, 1145 (2019). 
 177. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372–73 (1996). 
 178. See Chiang, supra note 3, at 527. The disclosure is made up of a description of the invention (the 
“specification”), figures if necessary, and one or more claims. See 35 U.S.C. § 111 (2018); id. § 112 
(specification); id. § 113 (drawings); id. § 111(a)(3) (claims). 
 179. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.  
 180. See 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2018); Chiang, supra note 3, at 533–34; Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, 
Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 68 (2004). 
 181. See Cotropia, supra note 6, at 96, 101–02. Sufficient support requires that the application’s disclosure 
enable a person skilled in the art to make and use the claimed invention, see In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 735 
(Fed. Cir. 1988), and that it conveys to that hypothetical person that the inventor had “possession” of the claimed 
invention at the time of filing. “Possession” can be established merely by writing down the invention in the 
patent application at filing. See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351–52 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 
Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 182. See, e.g., Chiang, supra note 3, at 544–45 (describing it as leading to “very little” increase in incentives 
to invent or disclose, while increasing social costs of the patent monopoly); Herbert Hovenkamp, Notice and 
Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. ONLINE 221, 228–31 (2011) (describing it as “threaten[ing] to deliver broader 
patent protection” than needed to incentivize innovation and increasing notice problems for potential infringers); 
Lemley & Moore, supra note 180, at 78–79 (describing it as seeming “fundamentally unfair” and inconsistent 
with incentive theory). 
 183. See Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 874 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Tun-Jen 
Chiang has written that, while “virtually never invoked,” there is a doctrine of “dishonest claiming” that renders 
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To facilitate later mining of the disclosure for post-filing innovation, 
original patent applicants are incentivized to use broad, vague language184 and 
include undeveloped, speculative post-filing innovation in the original patent 
application.185 This can obscure the actual invention and contribute to the 
opacity of patent disclosures, making their content less informative for other 
innovators. Moreover, these broad, vague, speculative disclosures can reduce 
incentives for future innovation by preventing others from patenting similar 
innovation later.186 
Supplementation grace periods relieve some of the pressure on applicants 
to try to capture post-filing innovation through their original patent applications. 
This, in turn, can improve the quality of the original applications’ disclosures. 
That said, much of the pressure to predict post-filing innovation in original 
applications remains, even with preferential treatment. An original patent 
application that successfully predicts post-filing innovation will have an earlier 
filing date than any supplementary application would; this can be advantageous 
both for improving the original applicant’s own exclusivity position (by 
antedating more prior art) and for thwarting others’ exclusivity (by creating 
more prior art against follow-on innovators’ would-be patentable innovation). 
B.  INCENTIVE THEORY 
As described briefly above, incentive-based theories of patent law broadly 
divide into those focused on patents’ influence on innovator behavior before 
patent rights are awarded (“ex ante” theories) and those focused on patents’ 
influence on innovator behavior after patent rights are awarded (“ex post” 
theories).187 The classic justification for patents is based on an ex ante theory: 
patents encourage innovation by rewarding innovation after it is created.188 
 
a claim invalid when a patentee is “being manifestly dishonest, and does not regard the new claim as being part 
of his invention.” See Chiang, supra note 3, at 531 n.37. 
 184. See Cotropia, supra note 6, at 116–17 (“The need to file early also prompts the inventor to intentionally 
draft the patent application . . . in vague and general terms. The specification needs to be intentionally general 
so that it can support later-filed continuations.”). 
 185. Cf. Tom Brody, Categories of Anti-Obviousness Case Law: (1) Laundry Lists; (2) Redundant 
Advantages; and (3) Advantage Not Needed and Not Relevant, 17 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 395, 
408–59 (2018) (discussing case law relating to laundry lists in prior art references). 
 186. For example, Benjamin Roin has described in the context of drugs: 
Not knowing which compound they will end up developing, the pharmaceutical companies draft 
their initial patent applications broadly to disclose . . . as many of the compounds under 
consideration as possible. As their research progresses . . . they narrow their patent claims and 
allow many of the originally disclosed compounds to fall into the public domain. . . . [T]heir prior 
disclosure will likely defeat any later claim of novelty, thus preventing them from being patented.  
Roin, supra note 18, at 529 (footnotes omitted). Sean Seymore has described more generally that patents 
claiming “undeveloped or underdeveloped subject matter” can “create roadblocks for subsequent inventors who 
can enable the claimed subject matter.” Seymore, supra note 62, at 1045. Janet Freilich has similarly described 
how the speculative disclosures in prophetic examples may create “an innovation dead zone.” Freilich, supra 
note 28, at 669. 
 187. See Lemley, supra note 164, at 130. 
 188. See Duffy, supra note 16, at 439–40; Lemley, supra note 164, at 129–30. 
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Others take an ex post view: patent exclusivity allows inventions to be developed 
and commercialized.189 The prominent early articulation of an ex post theory 
was the “prospect” theory set forth by Edmund Kitch in 1977, according to 
which broad, early rights would encourage later innovation by coordinating 
resources and effort.190 
Ex ante and ex post theories suggest different roles for patents in 
supplementary innovation. Under ex ante theories, the line between patentable 
and unpatentable innovation should be drawn between innovation requiring and 
not requiring patent-based reward incentives. To the extent that the 
nonobviousness doctrine approximates this line, patent-based exclusivity is not 
justified for minor supplementary innovation because the innovation should 
come about naturally without a patent reward.191 To the extent that anticipated 
innovation should already exist, there is similarly no reason to promote 
deepening supplementary innovation via patents.192 
Under many ex post theories, however, patent rights ought to have greater 
scope.193 These broad rights would protect follow-on innovation, including 
innovation—like supplementary innovation—that would, under ex ante theories, 
be unpatentable standing alone. Professor Kitch argued that patentees should be 
given these broad rights early in the innovation process to encourage the 
patentee’s development of the technology “without fear that the fruits of the 
investment will produce unpatentable information appropriable by 
competitors.”194 He argued that “[i]n the case of many patents, extensive 
development is required before any commercial application is possible . . . . The 
investments may be required simply to apply existing technology to the 
manufacture and design of the product and be so mechanical in their application 
as to be unpatentable.”195 
 
 189. Lemley, supra note 164, at 130; see generally Hrdy, supra note 164, at 27–41 (describing 
commercialization theories). 
 190. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977); see 
Duffy, supra note 16, at 440–41; Hrdy, supra note 164, at 27–28; Lemley, supra note 164, at 132–33. 
 191. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 9, at 608–09; Michael B. Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The 
Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1594, 1596 (2011) (explaining that “despite its 
apparent promise as the theoretical basis” for the nonobviousness doctrine, the inducement standard “has 
achieved only a modicum of influence,” and arguing that it should be “the touchstone for understanding and 
refining the obviousness doctrine”). 
 192. See Seymore, supra note 62, at 1033; accord Roin, supra note 18, at 518 (describing this rationale as 
“so widely accepted” as to be “almost canonical”). 
 193. See Lemley, supra note 164, at 131 (“The new ex post justifications, by contrast [to ex ante 
justifications], endorse a greater and perhaps unlimited duration and scope of intellectual property rights.”). 
However, not all ex post theories support broad patent rights. See Hrdy, supra note 164, at 31 (describing post-
Kitch commercialization theories and stating that “[n]one necessarily turns on the importance of broad, early 
patents held by single firms, and some directly contradict prospect theory’s assumptions”). 
 194. Kitch, supra note 190, at 276; see Duffy, supra note 16, at 440. 
 195. Kitch, supra note 190, at 276. There are limitations regarding prospect theory’s explanatory power 
regarding the treatment of more significant follow-on innovation. John Duffy has argued that Kitch’s articulation 
of the prospect theory failed to adequately address the fact that others can acquire rights to patentable 
improvements within the patent’s claims. As such, granting the pioneer patentee broad, early rights would not 
allow complete control and coordination of development. Duffy, supra note 16, at 455–58, 483–91; see also 
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Preferential treatment for original patent applicants creates overlap 
between the ex ante and ex post perspectives because, in effect, it allows patent 
rights to be awarded over a period of time, rather than at a single moment. Patent 
rights on supplementary innovation have an “ex post” effect relative to the 
original patent application, and an “ex ante” effect relative to the supplementary 
patent application. That is, viewed in ex ante terms, preferential treatment 
creates a patent reward for the original applicant for supplementary innovation 
where there otherwise would not have been one, since it transforms unpatentable 
innovation into patentable innovation. Viewed in ex post terms, preferential 
treatment creates an option (subject to any other prior art) when an original 
patent application is filed. That option can be exercised later by the original 
patent applicant to protect supplementary innovation that would have been 
unpatentable absent the preferential treatment. 
The effect of the reward or option depends on whether the supplementary 
innovation is within the scope of the original application’s patentable claims. 
When the supplementary innovation is within the scope of patentable claims of 
the original application—that is, the innovation is encompassed supplementary 
innovation196—the potential effect is smaller because the original patent 
applicant can already capture the value even without specific patent rights.197 An 
effect due to scope of exclusivity is thus limited, but the added term may give 
value to the reward or option.198 When, on the other hand, the supplementary 
innovation is not within the scope of patentable claims of the original 
application—that is, when the innovation is broadening supplementary 
innovation199—the potential effect of the reward or option is larger, since there 
can be additional term and scope. 
1.  An Ex Ante View 
By providing a patent reward for anticipated or obvious innovation, 
preferential treatment appears inconsistent with the classic ex ante justification 
for patents.200 But the novelty and nonobviousness doctrines do not perfectly 
divide innovation that would and would not come about naturally without a 
patent reward. Preferential treatment’s rewards for supplementary innovation 
 
Lemley, supra note 17, at 1008–10 (discussing the relationship between the original patentee’s and later 
improver’s rights when the improvement is “significant”). 
 196. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 197. See Duffy, supra note 16, at 484–87 (illustrating how broad patents that encompass improvements 
allow pioneer patentees to capture the full value of unpatentable improvements that can be freely appropriated, 
and allow pioneer patentees to coordinate investment in unpatentable improvements that cannot be freely 
appropriated); Lemley, supra note 17, at 1008 (describing how “[t]he law offers no protection to . . . minor 
improvers,” and “if the minor improvement does turn out to be infringing . . . the patent owner captures the value 
of the improvement”). 
 198. But a supplementary patent’s claims covering narrower, encompassed supplementary innovation can 
have some value deriving from their scope. For example, narrower claims can serve as insurance in case of later 
invalidation of the original patent’s claims. 
 199. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 200. See supra notes 191–192 and accompanying text. 
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can be desirable when socially valuable innovation is deemed unpatentable but 
will not come about naturally. 
Other scholars have argued for providing corrective patent incentives for 
anticipated or obvious innovation in this situation. For example, Benjamin Roin 
has described that without patent protection (or the expectation of patent 
protection), drug companies are unlikely to invest in post-discovery 
development.201 Yet, he argues, “the nonobviousness requirement withholds 
patent protection from the drugs that seem most promising before they have been 
developed.”202 He thus proposes rewards in the form of FDA-administered 
exclusivity periods to “fill the gaps left by the novelty and nonobviousness 
requirements.”203 Sean Seymore has similarly argued that “the current novelty 
rules prevent many socially valuable inventions from reaching the public.”204 He 
has proposed another form of corrective reward: he suggests allowing a 
“reinventor” to receive a period of exclusivity for inventions anticipated by 
earlier expired patents but not adequately disclosed.205 
Preferential treatment offers another approach to incentivizing 
supplementary innovation. Rather than targeting a corrective patent reward to a 
particular type of supplementary innovation (as Professors Roin and Seymore 
suggest), preferential treatment targets the corrective reward to a particular 
innovator—the original applicant. This targeting makes sense when the original 
applicant is best situated to pursue the post-filing innovation.206 Limiting 
exclusivity for supplementary innovation to original applicants can also avoid 
innovation-hampering patent thickets that patentability requirements prevent,207 
depending on how original applicants are defined.208 But because the patent 
rewards are not targeted to a particular type of supplementary innovation, they 
may not only incentivize socially valuable innovation, but also push original 
 
 201. See Roin, supra note 18, at 545–47. For a discussion of other, non-patent incentives for 
pharmaceuticals, see Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Innovation Policy Pluralism, 128 YALE L.J. 
544, 593–601 (2019). 
 202. Roin, supra note 18, at 531. He argues that “because the nonobviousness test focuses on whether the 
therapeutic properties of a drug are expected and not on whether the drug is socially valuable, the PTO and 
courts have rejected patent applications on drugs even though they are expected to be superior to known 
treatments and thus are expected to have great social value if developed.” Id. at 536. 
 203. Id. at 564. 
 204. See Seymore, supra note 62, at 1031. 
 205. See id. at 1034. 
 206. In the context of drugs, Dmitry Karshtedt has argued that typically “the original drug’s sponsor will 
control both the pioneering drug and its improvements” not simply because it owns the pioneer patent, but also 
because of its “immense head start” due to undisclosed know-how and data. Karshtedt, supra note 176, at 1158. 
 207. See supra note 12 and accompanying text; cf. Duffy, supra note 8, at 16 (describing, with respect to 
the pre-AIA system, that the nonobviousness requirement serves to allocate rewards among inventors, but when 
there is common ownership between applications, “allocating rewards among parties is not a concern,” so the 
“law thus eliminates the nonobviousness requirement in those circumstances and allows the granting of 
patents”). 
 208. See infra Part IV.C.4 for a discussion of how to define original applicants eligible for preferential 
treatment. 
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patent applicants to channel resources toward insignificant incremental 
innovation.209 
2.  An Ex Post View 
Preferential treatment’s offer of greater exclusivity on later stages of 
research, development, and commercialization is more obviously consistent 
with many ex post theories. Preferential treatment can give original patent 
applicants broader and longer patent rights, while also promoting early 
acquisition of original patent rights, consistent with prospect theory. But unlike 
the broad, early rights envisioned under prospect theory, preferential treatment 
for original patent applicants does not grant the full scope of rights up front. 
Rather, it permits the original applicant to subsequently broaden its rights in 
exchange for disclosing the supplementary innovation (and subject to any other 
prior art). This contributes to patents’ role in disclosing innovation to other 
innovators in a way that early broad patent rights cannot.210 
IV.  RECONSIDERING PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT 
Although preferential treatment for original applicants can help the patent 
system accommodate dynamic innovation processes and can increase disclosure 
and innovation incentives for post-filing innovation, the current complex and 
haphazardly developed statutory framework is not well-tailored to achieving 
these potential benefits. This Part first explains in more detail the current AIA 
framework for when supplementary innovation is patentable. It then considers 
the framework’s limitations and how the piecemeal formation of preferential 
treatment has departed from the original policy goals and reintroduced problems 
that had been mitigated by earlier statutory amendments. Finally, it offers an 
alternative approach. 
A.  PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT UNDER THE AIA 
Whether supplementary innovation can be patented in any particular 
circumstance (subject to any other prior art) under the AIA depends on four 
factors. The first of these is ownership or control of the original and 
supplementary applications: Is there common control?211 The second and third 
relate to the individuals involved in the innovation: How much overlap is there, 
if any, between the inventors of the original and supplementary applications? 
 
 209. Cf. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 9, at 609 (“[G]ranting patents to obvious developments may 
compromise the incentives that the patent system provides to develop nonobvious inventions.”). 
 210. Prospect theory has been described as generally “discount[ing] much of the teaching function of the 
patent system,” with disclosure being “less about teaching follow-on innovators and more about creating legal 
entitlements.” Anderson, supra note 163, at 1587–89 (discussing the relationship between prospect theory and 
disclosure). 
 211. See supra notes 139–140 and accompanying text. When there is common control, an original 
application that would be prior art under § 102(a)(2) is excluded under the safe harbor of § 102(b)(2)(C)–(c). 
See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2018). 
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Does the relevant disclosure in the original application originate from an 
inventor of the supplementary application?212 These first three factors determine 
whether a supplementation grace period exists, and if so, its duration. The fourth 
factor is timing: What is the delay between the filing of the original and 
supplementary applications? Put another way, does the supplementary 
application fall within the original application’s supplementation grace period? 
Broadly speaking, the closer the relationship between the original and 
supplementary applications as defined by the first three factors, the longer the 
supplementation grace period. When the relationship between the original and 
supplementary applications is strongest, supplementary innovation is patentable 
(subject to any other prior art) as long as it is filed within a year of the publication 
of the original application—that is, the supplementation grace period extends a 
year beyond publication of the original application.213 This is the case when the 
relevant disclosure in the original application originates from an inventor of the 
supplementary application, whether or not the applications are commonly 
controlled, and regardless of inventorship.214 
In other instances, the supplementary innovation is patentable (subject to 
any other prior art) as long as it is not filed after publication of the original 
application—that is, the supplementation grace period extends to the publication 
of the original application. This is the case when the relevant disclosure in the 
original application does not originate from an inventor of the supplementary 
application, but the applications are commonly controlled, regardless of 
inventorship.215 This is also the case when the relevant disclosure in the original 
 
 212. When the inventorship is identical between the original and supplementary applications, the original 
application is not prior art under § 102(a)(2) as naming “another inventor.” Id. § 102(a)(2). When the relevant 
disclosure in the original application originates from an inventor of the supplementary application, the original 
application is excluded from § 102(a)(1) and/or § 102(a)(2) prior art under the exceptions of § 102(b)(1)(A) and 
§ 102(b)(2)(A), respectively. See id. Because inventorship is based on the claims, it is possible for disclosure in 
the original application to originate from someone who is not named as an inventor on that application. See supra 
note 77.  
 213. The discussion in this and the following paragraphs assumes that the original application publishes in 
pre-grant form before it becomes a granted patent. If the original application becomes a granted patent without 
publishing in pre-grant form, the supplementation grace period is tied to the date of grant. 
 214. When the inventorship is identical between the two applications, the original application is not prior 
art under § 102(a)(2) because it does not name “another inventor.” 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2). As such, the original 
application is prior art only if it qualifies under § 102(a)(1). If the supplementary application is filed within a 
year of the original application’s publication, the exception of § 102(b)(1)(A) applies. See id. § 102(b)(1)(A).  
  When the inventorship is not identical between the two applications, the original application is not prior 
art under § 102(a)(2) because the exception of § 102(b)(2)(A) applies. See id. § 102(b)(2)(A). (And, if the 
applications are commonly controlled, the exception of § 102(b)(2)(C)–(c) also applies. See id. § 102(b), (c).) 
Thus, again, the original application is only prior art if it qualifies under § 102(a)(1). 
 215. When the inventorship is identical between the two applications, the original application is not prior 
art under § 102(a)(2) because it does not name “another inventor.” See id. § 102(a)(2). When the inventorship is 
not identical, the original application is not prior art under § 102(a)(2) because the common control exception 
of § 102(b)(2)(C)–(c) applies. See id. §102(b), (c). In either case, the original application is typically prior art 
under § 102(a)(1) when it publishes, since the exception under § 102(b)(1)(A) for disclosure originating from 
an inventor of the supplementary application does not apply. See id. § 102(a), (b). In some cases, however, 
another exception under § 102(b)(1)(B) may apply. See id. § 102(b)(1)(B).  
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application does not originate from an inventor of the supplementary application 
and the applications are not commonly controlled, but the applications have 
identical inventorship.216 
When the relationship between the original and supplementary applications 
is weak, the supplementary innovation is not patentable. In particular, no 
supplementation grace period typically exists if the relevant disclosure in the 
original application does not originate from an inventor of the supplementary 
application, there is no common control, and the applications do not have 
identical inventorship. This is true even if the applications have partially 
overlapping inventorship.217 
There are other doctrinal nuances and factual scenarios not addressed here. 
But even considering only the simple fact patterns above, it should be clear that 
the patentability of supplementary innovation in any given situation depends 
primarily on complicated line-drawing based on who is involved in the original 
and supplementary innovation and when the supplementary application is filed. 
But the patentability of supplementary innovation does not depend on what the 
supplementary innovation is. That is, no distinction is made between minor and 
deepening supplementary innovation, encompassed and broadening 
supplementary innovation, or no-fault and at-fault supplementary innovation. 
B.  LIMITATIONS OF THE AIA FRAMEWORK 
1.  Lost Correspondence to Double Patenting 
As Part II described, as Congress created and expanded the safe harbor 
under § 103 for commonly controlled innovation, it made clear its expectation 
that the safe harbor would be counterbalanced by expanded application of 
double patenting.218 This quid pro quo made sense in its original context of the 
1984 amendments. There, Congress was reacting to In re Bass, where the CCPA 
had used the “prior invention” of an earlier-issued patent as § 102(g) prior art in 
nonobviousness analysis under § 103.219 Obviousness-type double patenting 
similarly asks whether claims are obvious in view of the reference patent’s 
claims—not its disclosure as a whole.220 Thus, replacing § 102(g)-based 
 
 216. The original application is not prior art under § 102(a)(2), since it does not name “another inventor,” 
but it is typically prior art under § 102(a)(1) when it publishes, since the exception under § 102(b)(1)(A) for 
disclosure originating from an inventor of the supplementary application does not apply. See id. § 102(a), (b). In 
some cases, however, another exception under § 102(b)(1)(B) may apply. See id. § 102(b)(1)(B). Such scenarios 
are likely to be rare. 
 217. The original application is typically prior art retroactive to its filing date upon publication, since it 
“names another inventor” under § 102(a)(2), and the exceptions under § 102(b)(2)(A) and § 102(b)(2)(C)–(c) 
for origination from an inventor and common control, respectively, do not apply. See id. § 102(a), (b). In some 
cases, however, another exception under § 102(b)(2)(B) may apply. See id. § 102(b)(2)(B).  
 218. See supra Part II.B, II.C. 
 219. See In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276, 1286–88 (C.C.P.A. 1973); supra notes 79–104 and accompanying text. 
 220. See Geneva Pharm., Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 349 F.3d 1373, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing Gen. 
Foods Corp. v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH, 972 F.2d 1272, 1281–82 (Fed. Cir. 1992)) (“Because 
nonstatutory double patenting compares earlier and later claims, an earlier patent’s disclosure is not available to 
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obviousness with obviousness-type double patenting and terminal disclaimers 
restored the pre-Bass availability of additional patent scope, but not patent term, 
for certain later inventions. 
But once the safe harbor under § 103 was expanded to § 102(e) art in 
1999,221 obviousness-type double patenting and terminal disclaimers sometimes 
failed to restrict additional patent term. The entire disclosure, not just the claims, 
of an earlier-filed application is prior art under pre-AIA § 102(e) and 
corresponding post-AIA § 102(a)(2).222 A patent application’s disclosure is 
usually much more extensive than its claims.223 As such, the expanded safe 
harbor can result in a supplementary patent to which obviousness-type double 
patenting over the original patent does not apply. When there is no obviousness-
type double patenting, no terminal disclaimer will be required in the 
supplementary patent.224 
Allowing a supplementary application to issue without a terminal 
disclaimer leads to the loss of three benefits: a limitation on additional patent 
term, forward-looking common control requirements, and documentation in the 
record of the relationship between applications. 
An example helps illustrate the loss of these benefits. Consider 
AstraZeneca’s patents covering the recently approved drug Lokelma®, used to 
treat hyperkalemia (elevated potassium in the blood).225 Patents resulting from 
several different applications have been listed in the Food and Drug 
Administration’s Orange Book as covering Lokelma® or a method of using it,226 
including patents resulting from U.S. Application No. 13/371,080 and U.S. 
Application No. 14/060,279.227 Although it is difficult to know with certainty, it 
 
show nonstatutory double patenting.”). The specification is only considered to the extent that it is used to 
interpret the claims. See Sun Pharm. Indus., Ltd. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 611 F.3d 1381, 1387–88 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 221. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 222. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) (2000); 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2018). 
 223. See supra notes 177–178 and accompanying text. 
 224. Douglas Rogers has made a similar observation about double patenting doctrine’s scope. See Rogers, 
supra note 18. He has argued that “the Federal Circuit has improperly limited double patenting by determining 
the inventions involved through comparison only of the patents’ claims and not of their specifications.” Id. at 
324. He advocates for a strengthened double patenting doctrine that would prevent the same inventor or employer 
from patenting a species within the scope of that inventor or employer’s existing genus patent. See id. at 350–
76. 
 225. See LOKELMA, https://www.lokelma-hcp.com (last visited Feb. 4, 2021); Jerome P. Kassirer & Jay B. 
Wish, Disorders of Potassium Metabolism, in THERAPY OF RENAL DISEASES AND RELATED DISORDERS 63, 71 
(Wadi N. Suki & Shaul G. Massry eds., 2012). 
 226. New Drug Application (NDA) applicants must submit to FDA information regarding patents claiming 
the drug or a method of using it. See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2018). FDA’s publication containing this information, 
Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, is better known as the Orange Book. See 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH 
THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS, at iv (40th ed. 2020) [hereinafter APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS 
40TH]. 
 227. See APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS 40TH, supra note 226, at ADA 245; U.S. Patent No. 8,877,255, at [21] 
(issued from U.S. Application No. 14/060,279); U.S. Patent No. 8,802,152, at [21] (issued from U.S. Application 
No. 13/371,080). Thirteen patents were listed in the Orange Book for Lokelma® between its approval and July 
2020, but nine of these were continuing applications of other patents also listed. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
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is likely that U.S. Application No. 14/060,279 (the “supplementary ’279 
application”) fell within the supplementation grace period of U.S. Application 
No. 13/371,080 (the “original ’080 application”). They had the same owner and 
inventors, ZS Pharma, Inc. (which was acquired by AstraZeneca in 2015228) and 
Donald Keyser and Alvaro Guillem, respectively,229 and the supplementary ’279 
application’s priority date was within one year of the original ’080 application’s 
publication.230 
The supplementary ’279 application’s claims likely would have been found 
unpatentable if not filed within the supplementation grace period. The original 
’080 application describes microporous zirconium silicate (“ZS”) compositions 
formulated to remove toxins, including potassium ions, from the gastrointestinal 
tract without causing undesirable side effects.231 The supplementary ’279 
application adds new disclosure, including disclosure regarding compositions 
 
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE 
EVALUATIONS—CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT 7 JULY 2020, at A-40 (40th ed. 2020) [hereinafter APPROVED DRUG 
PRODUCTS 40TH—CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT]; APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS 40TH, supra note 226, at ADA 245; 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH 
THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS ADA 233 (39th ed. 2019) [hereinafter APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS 
39TH]; U.S. Patent No. 10,695,365, at [60] (claiming priority to U.S. Application No. 14/060,279); U.S. Patent 
No. 10,413,569, at [60] (claiming priority to U.S. Application No. 13/371,080); U.S. Patent No. 10,398,730, at 
[60] (claiming priority to U.S. Application No. 13/371,080); U.S. Patent No. 10,335,432, at [60] (claiming 
priority to U.S. Application No. 13/371,080); U.S. Patent No. 10,300,087, at [60] (claiming priority to U.S. 
Application No. 14/883,428); U.S. Patent No. 9,913,860, at [60] (claiming priority to U.S. Application No. 
14/060,279); U.S. Patent No. 9,861,658, at [60] (claiming priority to U.S. Application No. 13/371,080); U.S. 
Patent No. 9,844,567, at [60] (claiming priority to U.S. Application No. 13/371,080); U.S. Patent No. 9,592,253, 
at [21] (issued from U.S. Application No. 14/883,428); U.S. Patent No. 8,877,255, at [21] (issued from U.S. 
Application No. 14/060,279); U.S. Patent No. 8,808,750, at [60] (claiming priority to U.S. Application No. 
13/371,080); U.S. Patent No. 8,802,152, at [21] (issued from U.S. Application No. 13/371,080); U.S. Patent No. 
6,332,985, at [21] (issued from U.S. Application No. 09/597,337). 
 228. AstraZeneca Completes Acquisition of ZS Pharma, ASTRAZENECA (Dec. 17, 2015), 
https://www.astrazeneca.com/media-centre/press-releases/2015/AstraZeneca-completes-acquisition-of-ZS-
Pharma-17122015.html. 
 229. Compare U.S. Patent Application Pub. No. 2012/0213847, at [73], [75], with U.S. Patent Application 
Pub. No. 2014/0113002, at [73], [75]. 
 230. Compare ’847 Patent Application Pub., at [43] (published August 23, 2012), with ’002 Patent 
Application Pub., at [60] (claiming priority to provisional applications filed on October 22, 2012, and March 15, 
2013). The supplementary ’279 application was examined under pre-AIA §§ 102–103 because its claims had 
effective filing dates before March 16, 2013. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, § 3(n), 
125 Stat. 284, 293 (2011) (specifying that the amendments to §§ 102–103 take effect eighteen months after 
enactment); Non-Final Office Action, U.S. Patent Application No. 14/060,279, at 3 (Apr. 3, 2014), 
https://portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair (select “Application Number” under “Choose type of number”; then 
enter “14/060279” in search box; then click “Search”; then click “Image File Wrapper”; then follow “Non-Final 
Rejection” hyperlink) (stating that the claims have an effective filing date of March 15, 2013). Under pre-AIA 
§§ 102–03, the ’080 application was not prior art to the ’279 application under § 102(e) because it was not “by 
another” (assuming no non-inventors contributed to the disclosure), see supra note 77, and it was not prior art 
under § 102(b) because the ’279 application’s effective filing date was within a year of the ’080 application’s 
publication. See 35 U.S.C § 102 (2006). The ’279 application thus fell within the supplementation grace period 
of the ’080 application as long as the ’080 application was not prior art under § 102(a)—that is, as long as the 
invention of the ’279 application’s claimed invention was before the ’080 application’s publication. See id. 
Information about the timing of invention is not available in the record.  
 231. See ’152 Patent, at [57]. 
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having lower amounts of one form of ZS (“ZS-8”) based on the inventors’ 
finding that ZS-8 had higher solubility and therefore could undesirably increase 
levels of zirconium and silicates in the urine.232 
The supplementary ’279 application relies on this additional disclosure to 
claim an invention only slightly different from what is described in the original 
’080 application. The first claim of the patent issuing from the supplementary 
’279 application, U.S. Patent No. 8,877,255, reads: 
1. A zirconium silicate composition comprising zirconium silicate of formula 
(I): 
  ApMxZr1-xSinGeyOm  (I) 
where 
A is a potassium ion, sodium ion, rubidium ion, cesium ion, calcium ion, 
magnesium ion, hydronium ion or mixtures thereof, 
M is at least one framework metal, wherein the framework metal is hafnium 
(4+), tin (4+), niobium (5+), titanium (4+), cerium (4+), germanium 
(4+), praseodymium (4+), terbium (4+) or mixtures thereof, 
“p” has a value from about 1 to about 20, 
“x” has a value from 0 to less than 1, 
“n” has a value from 1 to about 12, 
“y” has a value from 0 to about 12, 
“m” has a value from about 3 to about 36 and 1≦n+y≦12, wherein the 
composition comprises ZS-9 and ZS-7 and lacks detectable amounts of 
ZS-8.233 
Everything in this claim was disclosed in the original ’080 application, with 
the exception of the last italicized phrase.234 When ZS Pharma presented a nearly 
identical claim in the European counterpart application, where the original ’080 
application was prior art, the European examiner stated that the claim did not 
involve an inventive step (analogous to nonobviousness235) as compared to the 
disclosure in the original ’080 application.236 But in the United States, the patent 
 
 232. See ’255 Patent, at cols. 6–7, 36. 
 233. Id. at col. 37 l. 7–26 (emphasis added).  
 234. Compare ’152 Patent, at cols. 3, 20, with ’255 Patent, at col. 37. 
 235. Duffy, supra note 8, at 1–2; Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 56, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 
U.N.T.S. 199 (“An invention shall be considered as involving an inventive step, if having regard to the state of 
the art, it is not obvious to a person skilled in the art.”) (emphasis added). 
 236. See European Search Opinion, European Patent Application No. EP13849651.8, at 1–3, EURO. PAT. 
REG. (Feb. 3, 2016), https://register.epo.org/application?number=EP13849651&lng=en&tab=doclist (follow 
“European Search Opinion” hyperlink). The applicant argued in response that the inventive step requirement 
was met, but it later amended the claims. See Amendments Received Before Examination, European Patent 
Application No. EP13849651.8, at 2–3, EURO. PAT. REG. (August 28, 2016), https://register.epo.org/ 
application?number=EP13849651&lng=en&tab=doclist (follow “Amendments received before examination” 
hyperlink); Reply to Communication from the Examining Division, European Patent Application No. 
EP13849651.8, at 1, EURO. PAT. REG. (Jan. 8, 2020), https://register.epo.org/application?number=EP13849651 
&lng=en&tab=doclist (follow “Reply to communication from the Examining Division” hyperlink). The 
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examiner did not use the original ’080 application as prior art in her obviousness 
rejection, despite being aware of it.237 The record thus suggests that the 
supplementation grace period allowed ZS Pharma to obtain additional patent 
coverage for its drug based on post-filing innovation about the specific forms of 
ZS that were more desirable.238 And although both the original ’080 and 
supplementary ’279 applications resulted in patents that covered the drug 
substance,239 the patent examiner did not find the ’279 application’s claims 
obvious in view of the ’080 application’s claims. Thus, no obviousness-type 
double patenting was found, and no terminal disclaimer was filed.240 
a.  Patent Term 
Without a terminal disclaimer, a supplementary patent’s term can extend 
beyond the term of the original patent. The Patent and Copyright Clause of the 
Constitution provides that Congress shall have power “[t]o promote the progress 
of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors 
the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”241 A limit on 
patent term reflects the view that monopolies, while permissible to the extent 
that they encourage innovation, should not be excessive; a monopoly that 
extends too broadly or too long is harmful to social welfare.242 Under current 
 
disclosure of original U.S. Patent Application No. 13/371,080 was prior art against the European application 
because European law excludes applications from prior art only until publication (and only for inventive step, 
not novelty). See supra note 153. 
 237. See Non-Final Office Action, U.S. Patent Application No. 14/060,279, at 4–12 (Apr. 3, 2014), 
https://portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair (select “Application Number” under “Choose type of number”; then 
enter “14/060279” in search box; then click “Search”; then click “Image File Wrapper”; then follow “Non-Final 
Rejection” hyperlink) (rejecting the claim under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over patent references to Ash and 
Bem et al. and relying on the original ’080 application as evidence of inherent properties disclosed in the Bem 
reference); U.S. Patent Application Pub. 2004/0105895, at [76]; U.S. Patent No. 5,891,417, at [75]. Further 
evidence that the U.S. examiner did not consider the original ’080 application to be prior art can be found in a 
continuation application claiming priority to the supplementary ’279 application, U.S. Patent Application No. 
14/628,017. See U.S. Patent Application Pub. No. 2015/0250821, at [63]. There, in examining a nearly identical 
claim, the examiner stated that the Bem reference was “arguably the closest prior art.” Non-Final Office Action, 
U.S. Patent Application No. 14/628,017, at 4–5 (May 9, 2017), https://portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair (select 
“Application Number” under “Choose type of number”; then enter “14/628017” in search box; then click 
“Search”; then click “Image File Wrapper”; then follow “Non-Final Rejection” hyperlink).  
 238. It is not possible to definitively determine whether the ’279 application actually qualified for the 
supplementation grace period without knowing the date of invention, which is not available in the record; nor is 
it possible to know from the record whether the patent examiner relied on the supplementation grace period 
during examination; nor is it possible to know whether the ’279 application’s claims would have been considered 
patentable over the ’080 application. Part IV.B.1.c addresses concerns about such lack of public notice. A 
detailed analysis of whether the ’279 application’s claims were obvious in view of the ’080 application is beyond 
the scope of this Article. 
 239. See APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS 40TH, supra note 226, at ADA 245. 
 240. See Transaction History, U.S. Patent Application No. 14/060,279, https://portal.uspto.gov/pair/ 
PublicPair (last visited Feb. 4, 2021) (select “Application Number” under “Choose type of number”; then enter 
“14/060279” in search box; then click “Search”; then click “Transaction History”). 
 241. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).  
 242. See Price, supra note 173, at 1619. 
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law, the term of a patent is twenty years from the application’s filing date, 
subject to certain adjustments.243 
When Congress dictated the replacement of § 102(g)-based obviousness 
with obviousness-type double patenting in 1984, the new safe harbor allowed 
original patent applicants additional scope but not longer term.244 But as a result 
of the subsequent expansions of the safe harbor, an original applicant can often 
receive later-expiring patent protection for post-filing innovation that would be 
unpatentable absent preferential treatment. For instance, in the Lokelma® 
example, the patent covering the drug resulting from the original ’080 
application expires on April 19, 2032; the patent resulting from the 
supplementary ’279 application expires a year and a half later, on October 22, 
2033.245 
b.  Common Control 
Terminal disclaimers to overcome an obviousness-type double patenting 
rejection provide not only that the issuing patent’s term will not extend beyond 
the term of the reference patent, but also that the patents are only enforceable if 
they remain commonly controlled.246 This forward-looking common control 
requirement addresses concerns that patents with similar claims will end up in 
the hands of different assignees and result in multiple suits against the same 
alleged infringer.247 
When supplementary applications become patents without terminal 
disclaimers over the original patent, there is no forward-looking restriction on 
ownership or control. Eligibility for preferential treatment based on common 
control is determined only at a single point in time—under current law, at the 
 
 243. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2018); supra note 157 and accompanying text.  
 244. See supra Part II.B. 
 245. See APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS 40TH, supra note 226, at ADA 245. ZS Pharma received slightly fewer 
additional days than based on the twenty-year term alone, because the earlier-expiring ’152 patent had sixty-
nine days of patent term adjustment under 35 U.S.C. § 154(b), whereas the later-expiring ’255 patent had none. 
Compare U.S. Patent No. 8,802,152, at [*] (filed Feb. 10, 2012), with U.S. Patent No. 8,877,255, at [*] (filed 
Oct. 22, 2013). An application for patent term extension under 35 U.S.C. § 156 has been filed in the ’152 patent, 
which would extend the term to May 18, 2032. See Application for Extension of Patent Term under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 156, U.S. Patent No. 8,802,152, at 11 (July 21, 2018), https://portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair (select “Patent 
Number” under “Choose type of number”; then enter “8802152” in search box; then click “Search”; then click 
“Image File Wrapper”; then follow “Patent Term Extension Application Under 35 USC 156” hyperlink). 
 246. When the two patents are commonly owned, the terminal disclaimer must include a provision that the 
issuing patent will be enforceable only for and during the period that they are commonly owned. 37 C.F.R. 
§ 1.321(c)(3) (2018). When the obvious-type double patenting is a result of the safe harbor for joint research 
agreements, the terminal disclaimer must include a provision waiving the right to separately enforce the patents, 
and providing that the issuing patent will be enforceable only for and during the period that the patents are not 
separately enforced. Id. § 1.321(d)(3). 
 247. In re Van Ornum, 686 F.2d 937, 944 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (citing DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 9.04(2)(b) 
(1981)). 
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supplementary application’s effective filing date.248 In some cases, the two 
applications may in fact never be commonly controlled if the supplementation 
grace period is a result of identical inventorship or origination of the original 
application’s relevant disclosure from an inventor of the supplementary 
application.249 
c.  Public Notice 
The relationships between patent applications typically must be explicitly 
stated in the record. This is true when an application claims the benefit of another 
application’s earlier filing date, and when a terminal disclaimer is filed.250 But 
when a supplementary patent does not have a terminal disclaimer over the 
original patent, there is often no indication in the record that the supplementary 
patent would be unpatentable but for the supplementation grace period. 
In the Lokelma® example above, for instance, there is nothing in the 
supplementary ’279 application’s record that links it to the original ’080 
application, nor is there anything in the original ’080 application’s record that 
links it to the supplementary ’279 application.251 Indeed, it is not possible to 
definitively determine from the record whether the ’279 application actually 
qualified for the supplementation grace period, whether the patent examiner 
relied on the supplementation grace period during examination, or whether the 
’279 application’s claims would have been considered patentable over the’080 
application had the supplementation grace period not applied. And assuming that 
the ’279 application was in fact patentable only as a result of the 
supplementation grace period, because there is no such indication in the record, 
another innovator aware of the original ’080 application, but not aware of the 
supplementary ’279 application, could incorrectly assume that obvious variants 
of what was disclosed in the original ’080 application were in the public domain. 
Such an assumption would not be unreasonable, since supplementary 
applications are an exception to the “fundamental premise” of patent law that 
 
 248. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(2)(C), (c)(1) (2018). Pre-AIA § 103(c) similarly assessed eligibility only at a 
single point in time (when the supplementary application’s claimed invention was made). See 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) 
(2006). 
 249. See supra Part IV.A. 
 250. See 35 U.S.C. § 119(e)(1) (2018) (requiring a specific reference to a provisional application); id. § 120 
(requiring a specific reference to an earlier-filed nonprovisional application); 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a) (2018) 
(requiring the disclaimer be recorded at the USPTO and stating that a notice of a disclaimer is published in the 
Official Gazette and attached to the patent). 
 251. The prosecution history of a different patent application, however, contains an erroneous statement in 
which the supplementary ’279 application is described as a continuation-in-part of the original ’080 application. 
See Response to Decision on Petition under 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(c) and (e), U.S. Patent Application No. 14/826,058, 
at 2 (Jan. 13, 2017), https://portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair (select “Application Number” under “Choose type 
of number”; then enter “14/826058” in search box; then click “Search”; then click “Image File Wrapper”; then 
follow “Petition for review by the Office of Petitions” hyperlink). See supra note 31 for a discussion of 
continuation-in-part applications. 
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“only significant inventions receive patent protection while minor 
improvements remain in the public domain.”252 
2.  Applicant Control over the Supplementation Grace Period 
The AIA also reverses some of the simplification of line-drawing between 
favored original patent applicants and others that was established by the reforms 
of 1984, 1999, and 2004. The supplementation grace period under the AIA is 
created by several layered carve-outs, each drawing the line differently between 
original applicants and others in ways that can impact the length of the 
supplementation grace period. As such, it is particularly subject to applicant 
manipulation. 
a.  Inventorship and Common Control 
Before the AIA, the supplementation grace period for eligible minor 
supplementary innovation extended until the original application’s publication 
(or issuance when there was no pre-grant publication).253 Pre-AIA law treated 
minor supplementary innovation equally whether it was by the same inventor 
group, by the same owner, or under a joint research agreement. Difficult line-
drawing between original applicants and others was therefore largely eliminated 
for minor supplementary innovation within almost all collaborative research 
environments. 
But the AIA reintroduced a new line-drawing problem by making the 
length of the supplementation grace period dependent on inventors and their 
contributions, even with common control.254 The AIA framework thus creates 
more opportunities and incentives to modify a supplementary application to 
make it fall within the supplementation grace period of an original patent 
application. 
 
 252. Pedraza-Fariña & Whalen, supra note 9, at 63. Occasionally, a supplementary application’s record will 
indicate that the applicant is relying on the supplementation grace period; this can happen, for example, when 
the USPTO incorrectly rejects a supplementary application over a commonly controlled original application, 
and the applicant then makes a statement during examination to remove the original application as prior art. See 
MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 135, § 717.02 (describing the procedure “to invoke 
common ownership to except a disclosure as prior art”). Even in these instances, however, the link between 
applications can be buried in hundreds of pages of correspondence between the applicant and USPTO. For 
example, ZS Pharma relied on the supplementation grace period in another application, U.S. Application No. 
14/536,056. There, the patent examiner rejected the application as obvious over the ’279 application. See Non-
Final Office Action, U.S. Patent Application No. 14/536,056, at 5 (Sept. 13, 2016), https://portal.uspto.gov/ 
pair/PublicPair (select “Application Number” under “Choose type of number”; then enter “14/536056” in search 
box; then click “Search”; then click “Image File Wrapper”; then follow “Non-Final Rejection” hyperlink); U.S. 
Patent Application Pub. No. 2014/0113002, at [21]. In response, ZS Pharma made a statement of common 
ownership to remove the ’279 application as prior art. See Petition for Extension of Time, Amendment and 
Response to Non-Final Office Action, U.S. Patent Application No. 14/536,056, at 13 (Mar. 13, 2017), 
https://portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair (select “Application Number” under “Choose type of number”; then 
enter “14/536056” in search box; then click “Search”; then click “Image File Wrapper”; then follow “Applicant 
Arguments/Remarks Made in an Amendment” hyperlink dated Mar. 23, 2017). 
 253. See supra notes 147–148 and accompanying text. 
 254. See supra notes 149–150, 213–217 and accompanying text. 
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For example, by adding an inventor to the supplementary application such 
that the relevant disclosure in the original application originates from an inventor 
of the supplementary application, a patent applicant can add a year to the 
supplementation grace period.255 Adding such an inventor is often within the 
applicant’s control. Inventorship is based on an application’s claims, and small 
changes to the claims can allow an applicant to add or remove an inventor.256 
Indeed, practitioners recommend this strategy for patenting supplementary 
innovation.257  
Applicants can also use ownership and joint research agreements to control 
which supplementary innovation is patentable. Since the common-control safe 
harbor developed to accommodate collaborative research,258 this is largely 
unproblematic. Yet the AIA departs from the original goal because the relevant 
date for assessing common control is the supplementary application’s date of 
filing, not its date of invention (as it was pre-AIA).259 
An applicant can therefore purchase certain earlier-filed applications 
before filing a new application (but after inventing its claimed invention) in 
order to remove the earlier-filed application as prior art.260 An applicant can 
similarly enter into a joint research agreement to remove certain earlier-filed 
applications owned by parties to the agreement, as long as the agreement is in 
effect by the new application’s filing date (even if it was not in effect at the time 
of invention). This requires only that the new application is developed as part of 
the joint research agreement; the applications removed as prior art do not need 
to result from work under the agreement.261 Thus, original and supplementary 
applications can be based on completely independent work.262 
 
 255. See supra notes 213–216 and accompanying text. 
 256. Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 116 (2018) (“Inventors may apply for a patent jointly even though . . . each did not 
make a contribution to . . . every claim.”); 37 C.F.R. § 1.48 (2018) (describing the procedures for correcting or 
changing inventorship, for example to due to “cancelation of claims in the application”); Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. 
Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“A contribution to one claim is enough.”). 
 257. See, e.g., Michael K. Henry, How to Avoid Your Own Patents and Applications as Prior Art Under the 
America Invents Act (AIA), HENRY PATENT L. FIRM (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.henrypatentfirm.com/ 
blog/prior-art-under-aia. Pre-AIA law created some incentives to manipulate inventorship for deepening 
supplementary innovation. Original patent applicants could create a supplementation grace period for deepening 
supplementary innovation by adding inventors to the supplementary application such that the disclosure in the 
original application was not “by another.” This would remove the original application’s disclosure as prior art 
under § 102(e). See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006); Lewis et al., supra note 62, at 83; TERRI SHIEH-NEWTON, MINTZ 
LEVIN IP SUMMER ACADEMY 2016, HOW TO OVERCOME REJECTIONS UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 102, at 48, 59–60 
(2016), https://www.mintz.com/newsletter/2016/Documents/IPSA2016/IPSA%20Presentations/Week%201/ 
IPSA2016%20Week%201%20All%20Presentations.pdf. 
 258. See supra Part II.B, II.C. 
 259. See supra notes 143–145 and accompanying text. 
 260. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(2)(C) (2018); MaCharri Vorndran-Jones, Donna M. Meuth, Tom Irving, 
Deborah Herzfeld & Stacy Lewis, Top Five Dangers for the AIA Unwary, 5 LANDSLIDE 10, 11–12 (2013). 
 261. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(c)(1)–(3); Matal, supra note 118, at 487; Vorndran-Jones et al., supra note 260, 
at 11; Dennis Crouch, The New Law Effective Today: 35 U.S.C. 102, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 16, 2013), 
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2013/03/the-new-law-effective-today-35-usc-102.html. 
 262. But in circumstances where the supplementation grace period would end with publication, a purchase 
or formation of a joint research agreement for the purpose of removing earlier-filed applications as prior art 
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b.  Publication 
Applicants can also influence the supplementation grace period’s length 
through the original application’s publication. As Part II.C.2 described, the 1999 
AIPA tied the supplementation grace period to publication, and this feature is 
maintained under the AIA. Under 35 U.S.C. § 122, a patent application is 
generally published eighteen months from its priority date.263 But an applicant 
may choose to keep its application secret until grant if no corresponding foreign 
or international application is filed that will publish at eighteen months.264 An 
applicant can thus substantially lengthen its supplementation grace period by 
requesting nonpublication, and some practitioners specifically recommend this 
strategy for patenting supplementary innovation.265 
C.  AN OWN PRIOR APPLICATION DISCLAIMER 
Instead of the current complex and haphazardly developed statutory 
framework, the Subparts that follow suggest an alternative approach to 
preferential treatment. This alternative approach would address the problems 
outlined above and simplify the statutory framework such that its parameters 
could be more directly tailored to policy goals. In particular, 35 U.S.C. § 102 
would be amended to eliminate the carve-outs that create preferential treatment 
for original applicants. This would clear away the layered statutory provisions 
that have accumulated piecemeal over time, and would give original applicants’ 
earlier-filed applications the same prior art effect as others’ earlier-filed 
applications.266 
 
would presumably require the applicant of the intended supplementary application to know about the original 
application while it was still secret, suggesting some prior relationship between the parties. 
 263. See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1). 
 264. Id. § 122(b)(2)(B)(i). A study of U.S. applications that ultimately became patents found that 7.5% of 
applications filed between 2001 and 2005 took advantage of § 122(b)(2)(B)(i)’s pre-grant secrecy provision. See 
Graham & Hegde, supra note 132, at 5. Even if an applicant may not or does not file a nonpublication request, 
it can take other steps to delay publication. For example, filing an incomplete application can delay publication 
slightly. Cf. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 135, § 710.02(d) (describing that the 
period for reply to a Notice to File Missing Parts of an application can be extended by up to five months). 
 265. See CARLYN BURTON, OSHA LIANG LLP, TIMING IS EVERYTHING: WHEN TO FILE A PATENT 
APPLICATION 9 (2010); cf. Crouch, supra note 145 (“Theoretically, the exception [of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(2)(C)] 
favors . . . applicants who file applications under non-publication requests.”); Patent Application Publication, 
NEUSTEL ATT’YS AT L., https://www.neustel.com/patents/patent-applications/patent-application-publication 
(last visited Feb. 4, 2021) (describing as a reason for a nonpublication request that “[i]f you abandon this patent 
application and it is not published, the patent application cannot be used as prior art by the U.S. Patent Office to 
reject a later filed patent application by you for a related invention”). Prior to the institution of pre-grant 
publication, it was similarly possible to lengthen the supplementation grace period by invoking strategies to 
delay issuance (thus requiring that the patentee delay the start of its patent rights). Under the pre-grant 
publication regime, however, delaying or avoiding pre-grant publication has no direct effect on the timing of 
patent issuance. 
 266. More specifically, the amendments would make original patent applicants’ earlier-filed applications 
retroactively eligible as prior art as of their effective filing date upon publication or grant. To accomplish this, 
the amendments would remove the language “names another inventor” from § 102(a)(2) and eliminate the carve-
outs for disclosures originating from an inventor and for commonly controlled applications. This would render 
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Further statutory amendments would then allow an original applicant to 
remove its earlier-filed application(s) as prior art—and thus obtain a 
supplementary patent despite its unpatentability over the prior art original 
application—by making certain concessions.267 These concessions would limit 
the rights created by the supplementary patent and include (1) disclaiming patent 
term beyond that available from the original patent application; (2) maintaining 
common control over the original and supplementary applications and any 
resulting patents; and (3) providing clear public notice of the relationship 
between the original and supplementary applications. These concessions would 
be made via what this Article terms an “own prior application disclaimer” 
(“OPA disclaimer”). OPA disclaimers would complement existing terminal 
disclaimers for obviousness-type double patenting. 
1.  Disclaimed Term 
An OPA disclaimer would disclaim patent term beyond that of a patent 
issuing from the original patent application. Like terminal disclaimers filed in 
response to obviousness-type double patenting (“ODP disclaimers”), OPA 
disclaimers would rely on 35 U.S.C. § 253(b), which permits an applicant to 
“disclaim or dedicate to the public the entire term, or any terminal part of the 
term, of the patent granted or to be granted.”268 Because patent terms are 
calculated as a time period (generally twenty years) from filing,269 filing an OPA 
disclaimer would result in the supplementary patent’s expiration date being 
calculated from the filing date of the original application, rather than from the 
filing date of the supplementary application.270 This is consistent with 
Congress’s initial expectation that expanded preferential treatment for original 
patent applicants would not result in lengthened patent terms.271 
An OPA disclaimer would limit the term of a patent issuing from the 
supplementary application whether or not the original application matured into 
a patent. This is a key distinction from an ODP disclaimer. An ODP disclaimer 
gives up the portion of the term of one patent that extends beyond the term of 
another patent. Although an ODP disclaimer can be filed over a pending 
application,272 if the application never matures into a patent there can be no 
double patenting, and no term need be disclaimed. The effect of OPA 
 
published applications and granted patents § 102(a)(2) art, regardless of inventorship, origination of disclosure, 
or control. 
 267. The supplementary patent would be granted (subject to any other prior art) despite its unpatentability 
over the original U.S. patent application and any other publications of the same patent disclosure (that is, 
continuation or divisional applications and international or foreign counterparts). 
 268. 35 U.S.C. § 253(b) (2018); In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 894 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 269. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a); supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
 270. The supplementary patent’s term could still be extended by patent term “adjustment” to account for 
delays within the USPTO and/or “extension” to account for premarket regulatory review, and/or shortened by 
ODP disclaimer(s). See 35 U.S.C. § 154(b) (patent term adjustment); id. § 156 (patent term extension).  
 271. See supra Parts II.B, II.C, IV.B.1. 
 272. See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 135, § 804(I)(B). 
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disclaimers could not be limited in this way; if it were, an original patent 
applicant could shift its patent term later by serially filing and abandoning 
applications if no intervening prior art existed.  
Disclaimers of term would have varying effects on supplementary patents’ 
incentive function depending on the type of supplementary innovation (as 
discussed further in Part IV.C.4) and depending on the commercial significance 
of the end portion of patent term. In industries with short product cycles, the end 
portion of patent term may have little practical significance. In industries with 
long product life cycles like the pharmaceutical industry,273 on the other hand, 
each day at the end of a patent’s term can be very valuable. For blockbuster 
drugs, extending patent term by a matter of months can lead to hundreds of 
millions of dollars of additional profits.274 
2.  Common Control 
The current framework for preferential treatment leaves open the 
possibility that original and supplementary applications are separately controlled 
and enforced. OPA disclaimers would, like ODP disclaimers, provide a 
mechanism for placing forward-looking restrictions on their control.275 That is, 
OPA disclaimers could require that original and supplementary applications 
remain commonly controlled in order for the patents to be enforceable and that 
the owner(s) waive the right to separately enforce any patents issuing from the 
original and supplementary applications. Such restrictions cannot be workably 
implemented under the current system.276 
Ensuring that original and supplementary applications and patents are 
commonly controlled at licensing and enforcement reduces preferential 
treatment’s potential to hamper innovation by others. In particular, it mitigates 
the risk of alleged infringers facing multiple suits, and of potential licensees 
needing to negotiate with multiple potential licensors.277 
 
 273. See Henry Grabowski, Patents and New Product Development in the Pharmaceutical and 
Biotechnology Industries, 8 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 7, 8 (2003) (comparing product life cycles between the 
pharmaceutical industry and other industries, and describing that “R&D investment periods and product life 
cycles are typically much shorter in” industries “such as computer technologies, scientific instruments, and 
semiconductors”). 
 274. Feldman, supra note 40, at 601. But drugs with secondary patents that extend the effective patent terms 
are more likely to attract generic challenges. See C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do Generics 
Challenge Drug Patents?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 613, 635 (2011). If supplementary patents that extend 
effective patent term are likely to be found invalid based on the primary patent (or an earlier secondary patent), 
an ODP disclaimer’s actual impact on effective term might be less than suggested on its face. 
 275. See supra note 246 and accompanying text. 
 276. See supra notes 143, 248 and accompanying text. 
 277. Cf. Cotropia, supra note 9, at 1525 (noting that different patentees holding rights “on small technical 
advances make it extremely difficult and ‘expensive to search and to license’ these patents in order to produce 
further innovations”) (citing FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION ch. 4, at 3 (2003)). 
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3.  Public Notice 
The current system also usually provides no indication in the record of the 
relationship between the original and supplementary applications.278 Under an 
OPA disclaimer system, the original patent applicant would need to file an OPA 
disclaimer with the USPTO, rather than an exception applying automatically as 
under current law. OPA disclaimers would thus provide a mechanism for making 
information about the relationship between the applications easily available to 
the public. For example, like an ODP disclaimer, an OPA disclaimer could be 
indicated on a patent’s face and in the USPTO’s public application database.279 
Applicants could be required to file any OPA disclaimer with the USPTO within 
a short period after filing the supplementary application, similar to requirements 
for claims of priority to earlier-filed applications.280 
OPA disclaimers would thus substantially improve public notice as to the 
potential scope and duration of rights available to the original patent applicant. 
In particular, an indication on the face of the original application’s pre-grant 
publication or resulting patent would serve as a warning to other innovators who 
might incorrectly assume that obvious variants were in the public domain. And 
by helping others identify and understand the relationships within a patent 
portfolio, an indication in each application’s record would reduce supplementary 
applications’ contribution to patent thickets.281 
4.  Eligibility for Preferential Treatment 
The statutory amendments would also need to define the eligibility criteria 
for preferential treatment. These include (1) who is eligible for preferential 
 
 278. See supra Part IV.B.1.c. 
 279. See Quick Guide to Locating Patent Term Information on the USPTO Web Site, USPTO, 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/patents/law/How_to_Locate_Patent_Term_Information.docx (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2021) (pages 7–8). OPA disclaimers would ideally appear (unlike ODP disclaimers) in the 
database entries for both the original and supplementary applications and any of their children, on the face of 
both applications’ pre-grant publications and resulting patents, and on the face of both applications’ children’s 
pre-grant publications and resulting patents. 
 280. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(a)(4) (2018). ODP disclaimers, in contrast, can be filed during an application’s 
pendency or after issuance (but not after expiration of the reference patent). See Boehringer Ingelheim Int’l 
GmbH v. Barr Labs., Inc., 592 F.3d 1340, 1347–48 (Fed. Cir. 2010). ODP disclaimers can even be filed during 
litigation in response to a finding of invalidity due to obviousness-type double patenting. Id. at 1347; Jeffrey I. 
D. Lewis, Curing Double Patenting During Prosecution and After Issuance: When Once Is Never Enough and 
Twice Is Too Much, 21 AIPLA Q. J. 34, 48–50 (1993). 
  Because applicants can pursue a series of continuing applications off of a parent application to form a 
patent family, see 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2018); Chiang, supra note 3, at 533–34; Lemley & Moore, supra note 180, 
any OPA disclaimer would need to be filed in the first nonprovisional application in a family. The OPA 
disclaimer would then also apply to any later applications claiming priority to the first application. Otherwise, 
applicants could file OPA disclaimers in some family members but not others, effectively eliminating the public 
notice function. 
 281. Preferential treatment encourages innovators to file patent applications that they would not otherwise 
file, see supra Part III.A.1, potentially contributing to large patent portfolios. Large patent portfolios, in turn, 
can contribute to patent thickets that are difficult for others to navigate. See Day & Schuster, supra note 41, at 
127–30; Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 7, at 62–64. 
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treatment; (2) when preferential treatment is available; and (3) what type of 
supplementary innovation is eligible. Each of these received piecemeal, if any, 
attention during the historical development of preferential treatment for original 
patent applicants. 
a.  Who Is Eligible 
Of these criteria, who is eligible for preferential treatment—that is, how to 
define an “original patent applicant”—received the most attention historically. 
The CCPA struggled with drawing the line between favored original patent 
applicants and others in the 1960s, and Congress has since shifted the line toward 
expanded eligibility, first to include whole organizations, then to include 
collaborative teams across organizations.282 The AIA defines who is eligible by 
three layered criteria: common control, identical inventorship, and origination 
of the original disclosure from an inventor of the supplementary application.283 
An OPA disclaimer’s ongoing common control requirement would create 
the most important constraint regarding who is eligible for preferential 
treatment. As described above, requiring ongoing common control would 
mitigate some of the key ways that supplementary applications can hamper 
innovation by others.284 It would also make preferential treatment more 
consistent with theoretical justifications for nonobviousness by eliminating the 
requirement (along with novelty) when allocation of rewards between parties is 
not needed.285 
Additional eligibility requirements beyond common control depend on 
policy goals. If, consistent with its historical development, the primary goal of 
preferential treatment is to accommodate the difficulty of mapping complex, 
collaborative research and development to the patent system, an ongoing 
common control requirement alone would award preferential treatment to too 
much supplementary innovation. Common control, especially based on common 
ownership by large or decentralized institutions, such as universities, may not 
reflect any collaboration.286  
Requiring common control in combination with knowledge transfer 
between innovators involved in the original and supplementary innovation 
would better tailor preferential treatment to collaborative work, but documenting 
knowledge transfer could impose substantial burdens on patent applicants. 
Relying on origination of the original application’s relevant disclosure from an 
inventor of the supplementary innovation is a reasonable, if not perfect, proxy 
 
 282. See supra Part II.B, II.C. 
 283. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2018); supra Part IV.A. 
 284. See supra Part IV.C.2. 
 285. See supra notes 9–13 and accompanying text; cf. Duffy, supra note 8, at 14–16 (describing, with respect 
to pre-AIA law, that the nonobviousness requirement serves to allocate rewards among inventors, but that when 
there is common ownership between these applications, “allocating rewards among parties is not a concern,” so 
the “law thus eliminates the nonobviousness requirement in those circumstances”). 
 286. Cf. Crouch, supra note 261, at n.7 (“Large companies who file many patent applications receive 
additional relief from their own prior art . . . .”). 
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for actual knowledge transfer between innovators. Opportunities for 
manipulating eligibility via inventorship could be reduced by assessing 
eligibility on a claim-by-claim basis in the supplementary application, rather 
than based on the inventorship of the supplementary application as a whole.287 
If, however, the primary goal of preferential treatment is to increase 
disclosure and innovation incentives for supplementary innovation, rather than 
to reflect collaborative work, additional requirements beyond common control 
may be unnecessary. Allowing companies to purchase original patent 
applications to gain preferential treatment, for example, would allow 
redistribution of these incentives to entities valuing exclusivity as to 
supplementary innovation higher than the original applicants. 
b.  When Preferential Treatment Is Available 
Another important consideration is when preferential treatment is 
available—that is, the length of the supplementation grace period. The temporal 
boundaries of preferential treatment received little attention historically, even 
while undergoing significant changes with the passage of the AIPA and AIA.288 
A supplementation grace period of zero would eliminate preferential 
treatment; a supplementation grace period of infinite duration would allow an 
original applicant to patent supplementary innovation occurring at any time 
(subject to any other prior art). Between these extremes, supplementation grace 
periods could be set by duration (for example, months from the original 
application’s filing), by original application status (for example, publication or 
issuance), or by a non-patent event (for example, regulatory approval, sale of a 
product, licensing, assignment, or enforcement). They could also be set by a 
combination of these approaches, as under the AIA, where the supplementation 
grace period ends with the original application’s publication or a year 
thereafter.289 
Even if the supplementation grace period were infinite, an effective 
temporal limit would often be formed by the original applicant’s own non-patent 
prior art. The original applicant can create prior art against its own 
supplementary application through a printed publication, public use, sale, or 
other public disclosure more than a year before the supplementary application is 
filed.290 The OPA disclaimer proposed here would not have any effect on non-
 
 287. Because the OPA disclaimer would be ineffective for ineligible claims, the content of the prior art 
could vary by claim. This can also occur when a patent application claims priority to a provisional application 
or is a continuation-in-part. In these cases, the effective filing date (and thus the content of the prior art) is 
determined individually for each claim. See Lucent Tech., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 543 F.3d 710, 718 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). 
 288. See supra Part II.C.2, II.D. 
 289. See supra Parts II.D, IV.A. 
 290. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2018) (setting forth sources of prior art); id. § 102(b)(1)(A) (setting forth a 
one-year grace period for disclosures by an inventor). 
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patent prior art. These other forms of the original applicants’ own prior art could 
thus generate an effective end date for the supplementation grace period.291 
Setting aside these limits created by other forms of own prior art, the most 
notable effects of the supplementation grace period’s length are on the scope of 
exclusivity for original patent applicants, on the timing of public notice 
regarding that exclusivity, and on how original patent applicants allocate their 
resources. 
A longer supplementation grace period increases the chance that an original 
patent applicant will invent supplementary innovation in time to patent it. 
Moreover, a longer supplementation grace period changes what post-filing 
innovation an original applicant can patent as a result of preferential treatment. 
Nonobviousness is assessed as of the supplementary application’s filing; when 
this date is later, the scope of follow-on innovation that is obvious in view of 
other technological developments since the original application may be 
broader.292 The boundary between unpatentable and patentable innovation thus 
shifts over time. Follow-on innovation that is initially patentable in view of an 
original application, and thus equally subject to patent exclusivity by the original 
applicant and others, may later be unpatentable, and thus subject to patent 
exclusivity only by the favored original applicant. A longer supplementation 
grace period allows for more shifting of this boundary. 
A longer supplementation grace period thus increases uncertainty for the 
public regarding an original patent applicant’s ultimate scope of exclusivity. It 
delays public notice as to how much of the potential scope of exclusivity the 
original applicant has actually attempted to capture through supplementary 
applications, while also increasing uncertainty as to the boundary of that 
potential scope. Longer supplementation grace periods also have the potential to 
change innovation incentives for original patent applicants by encouraging them 
to direct resources toward supplementary innovation, rather than other 
innovation, for longer.293 
The supplementation grace period’s length can have other effects as well. 
For example, longer supplementation grace periods are likely to result in more 
 
 291. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text for discussion of a few examples of these forms of prior 
art. For more discussion of non-patent own prior art before and after the AIA, see, for example, Phillip W. Goter, 
The Commercial Exploitation Continuum, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 795 (2012); Dmitry Karshtedt, Did 
Learned Hand Get It Wrong?: The Questionable Patent Forfeiture Rule of Metallizing Engineering, 57 VILL. L. 
REV. 261 (2012); Lemley, supra note 65; Mark Levy, An Analysis of the On Sale Bar and Its Impact on the 
Structure and Negotiation of Development Agreements, 30 U. DAYTON L. REV. 181 (2004); Shashank Upadhye, 
To Use or Not to Use: Reforming Patent Infringement, the Public Use Bar, and the Experimental Use Doctrine 
as Applied to Clinical Testing of Pharmaceutical and Medical Device Invention, 4 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1 
(2002); John C. Williams, Note, Giving Meaning to “Otherwise Available to the Public”: How Helsinn 
Perpetuates a Version of the On-Sale Bar to Patentability that Disproportionately Burdens Small Inventors, 97 
TEX. L. REV. 421 (2018). 
 292. Cf. Holbrook, supra note 2, at 1474–75 (“[B]ecause the knowledge of the PHOSITA expands over 
time, the nature of the prior art teaching also changes.”). 
 293. Cf. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 9, at 609 (“[G]ranting patents to obvious developments may 
compromise the incentives that the patent system provides to develop nonobvious inventions.”). 
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new applications than shorter ones. Increased numbers of applications and 
issued patents may be more difficult for others to navigate, even if the original 
and supplementary applications are commonly controlled and publicly disclosed 
as this Article proposes. Scholars have also suggested that high volumes of 
patent applications overload the USPTO and contribute to poor quality 
examination, leading to more invalid patents.294 On the other hand, because 
supplementation grace periods may decrease pressure on applicants to try to 
capture post-filing innovation through original patent applications,295 at least 
some supplementary applications may replace continuing applications. 
These effects mean that supplementation grace periods cannot be 
lengthened without some costs. Yet, there are good reasons to consider coupling 
the supplementation grace period’s end to patent issuance (as it was before the 
AIPA instituted pre-grant publication), rather than to patent application 
publication.296 In such a system, a supplementary application could be filed any 
time during the original application’s pendency. Once the original application 
matured into a granted patent or went abandoned after publication, the 
supplementation grace period would close.297 
This approach would eliminate the largely arbitrary difference in 
supplementation grace periods between original applications that undergo pre-
grant publication and those that do not. Coupling the supplementation grace 
period’s end to patent issuance is also appealing because issuance marks the start 
of enforceable patent rights.298 Original applicants would be able to extend the 
supplementation grace period by delaying issuance of the original patent.299 But 
unlike extending the supplementation grace period by delaying or opting out of 
pre-grant publication, delaying issuance requires the original applicant to make 
a potentially meaningful sacrifice by giving up a beginning portion of its 
exclusivity.300 The appeal of trading exclusivity for an extended 
 
 294. See Cotropia, supra note 6, at 104–05; Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s 
Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 46–47 (2007). 
 295. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 296. This approach would lengthen the supplementation grace period in most cases. See supra notes 131–
133. 
 297. If the original application went abandoned without publication, it would never become prior art. See 
35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2018). There is a small window in which an application could go abandoned before 
publication, yet still publish. Cf. 37 C.F.R. § 1.138(c) (2018) (describing that a petition for express abandonment 
to avoid publication should be received by the USPTO more than four weeks before the projected publication 
date to provide sufficient time to remove the application from the publication process). 
 298. But see 35 U.S.C. § 154(d) (creating provisional rights beginning with application publication, if the 
invention claimed in the published application is “substantially identical” to the invention ultimately claimed in 
the granted patent). 
 299. An applicant can use various tactics to delay issuance, such as taking extensions of time, filing requests 
for continued examination, requesting suspension of action, and abandoning pending applications in favor of 
continuing applications. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136 (extensions of time); id. § 1.114 (requests for continued 
examination); id. § 1.103 (suspension of action); 35 U.S.C. § 120 (continuing applications). The USPTO fees 
associated with these methods of delay could be significant in the aggregate. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.17. 
 300. Some strategies for delaying issuance could also result in an original applicant giving up an end portion 
of its exclusivity. Patent term adjustment can be added onto a patent’s twenty-year term for USPTO’s delays 
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supplementation grace period would likely vary by industry. In the 
pharmaceutical industry, where an initial patent filing is usually many years 
before product launch,301 applicants might value the beginning portion of their 
exclusivity less than the ability to patent more supplementary innovation.302 In 
other industries where product cycles are shorter, such as the electronics 
industry,303 applicants might be more likely to value earlier exclusivity over a 
longer supplementation grace period. 
A key critique of coupling the end of the supplementation grace period to 
issuance rather than to pre-grant publication is that preferential treatment for 
original patent applicants has historically been an exception to “secret” prior 
art.304 As such, the supplementation grace period’s duration has been tied to 
public availability of the original patent application. Lengthening the 
supplementation grace period to extend more than a year beyond the original 
application’s publication would thus be a significant departure from historical 
precedent, in that it would allow original patent applicants to patent innovation 
that was unpatentable as compared to information that had been publicly 
available for a substantial period of time.305 
Although it would depart from precedent, allowing supplementary 
applications over publicly available original applications is not inconsistent with 
the broader theoretical justifications for treating an applicant’s own public 
disclosures as prior art. Inventors are typically barred from patenting an 
invention more than a year after it has been available to the public because 
“inventions that the public reasonably has come to believe are freely available” 
should not be removed from the public domain.306 This justification makes sense 
for disclosures such as those via academic publications, sales of a product, or 
 
during prosecution, see 35 U.S.C. § 154(b), but USPTO delays are offset by delays attributable to the applicant. 
See Stephanie Plamondon Bair, Adjustments, Extensions, Disclaimers, and Continuations: When Do Patent 
Term Adjustments Make Sense?, 41 CAP. U. L. REV. 445, 454–55 (2013). 
 301. See Grabowski, supra note 273, at 11; Roin, supra note 18, at 529. 
 302. On the other hand, patent applicants in the pharmaceutical industry are careful to accumulate as much 
patent term adjustment as possible, so strategies to delay patent issuance that would decrease patent term 
adjustment would be undesirable. See supra note 300. 
 303. Cf. Grabowski, supra note 273, at 8 (describing that “R&D investment periods and product life cycles 
are typically much shorter in” industries “such as computer technologies, scientific instruments, and 
semiconductors”). 
 304. See supra Part II; supra note 18. 
 305. A detailed analysis of constitutional considerations in patentability is beyond the scope of this Article, 
but it is worth noting that a (likely very weak) constitutional challenge to this change might be based on the 
Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution’s role as “both a grant of power and a limitation.” Graham v. 
John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966). Congress may not “enlarge the patent monopoly without regard to the 
innovation, advancement or social benefit gained thereby” or “authorize the issuance of patents whose effects 
are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already 
available.” Id. at 6; see also Roin, supra note 18, at 557 (suggesting that “carv[ing] out an exemption in the 
novelty and nonobviousness standards for drugs . . . . could even be considered unconstitutional under current 
Supreme Court precedent”); Seymore, supra note 62, at 1068 n.310 (“Commentators agree that novelty is a 
constitutional requirement. Nonobviousness has constitutional underpinnings in that some standard of creativity 
might be needed to support patentability.”) (citations omitted). 
 306. Delano Farms Co. v. Cal. Table Grape Comm’n, 778 F.3d 1243, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
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trade show displays, where there is no clear signal to the public of patent rights. 
But during the original application’s pendency, the public cannot reasonably rely 
on the availability of the innovation it discloses. Indeed, the assumption should 
be exactly the opposite—that the innovation may end up the subject of exclusive 
rights and therefore is not available to the public. Public reliance becomes 
reasonable only when the original patent application and any continuing 
applications are no longer pending, and therefore the complete set of rights are 
defined.307 This justification is thus particularly tenuous for encompassed 
supplementary innovation, which falls entirely within the scope of patentable 
claims of the original application. 
c.  What Type of Supplementary Innovation Is Eligible 
Under the current framework, the patentability of supplementary 
innovation does not depend on the nature of the innovation itself—that is, no 
distinction is made between minor and deepening supplementary innovation, 
encompassed and broadening supplementary innovation, or no-fault and at-fault 
supplementary innovation. It may be best to maintain this approach under an 
OPA disclaimer system; introducing distinctions would significantly increase 
the system’s complexity. While line-drawing between minor and deepening 
supplementary innovation would be relatively straightforward and finds 
precedent in pre-AIA law,308 line-drawing between encompassed and 
broadening supplementary innovation, and between no-fault and at-fault 
supplementary innovation, would be substantially more complex. That said, 
these types of supplementary innovation involve different considerations. It is 
thus worth briefly noting how these considerations could be used to tailor an 
OPA system more closely to policy goals. 
One key consideration, for example, is the difference in effect of 
disclaiming patent term on disclosure and innovation incentives for 
encompassed versus broadening supplementary patents. As Part III described, 
under the current system, patents on broadening supplementary innovation offer 
additional term and scope, whereas patents on encompassed supplementary 
innovation offer only additional term.309 The OPA disclaimers proposed here 
would restrict any additional term from supplementary patents. Broadening 
supplementary patents would thus offer only additional scope; encompassed 
supplementary patents would offer neither additional scope nor term.310 This 
outcome is consistent with a system of preferential treatment focused on 
accommodating complex and collaborative research. If, however, maintaining 
significant patent-based disclosure and innovation incentives for all 
supplementary innovation is a primary policy goal, a modified OPA disclaimer 
 
 307. Even then, it is possible for the patentee to change the scope of its claims. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 251 
(2018) (providing for reissue of “defective” patents). 
 308. See supra Part II.A, II.C. 
 309. See supra notes 157–159 and accompanying text. 
 310. But even without additional scope or term, encompassed supplementary patents can have value for 
original applicants. See supra note 198. 
624 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 72:565 
system could require a disclaimer of term only for broadening supplementary 
patents. For encompassed supplementary patents, only ongoing common control 
and public notice would be required. Preferential treatment would thus offer 
scope but not term for broadening supplementary innovation, and term but not 
scope for encompassed supplementary innovation. 
The distinctions between broadening and encompassed supplementary 
applications also suggest other differences in how preferential treatment could 
be structured. For example, concerns associated with longer supplementation 
grace periods regarding expanded boundaries and delayed public notice of 
potential or actual exclusivity are more salient for broadening supplementary 
applications. If these concerns were of particular policy importance, the 
supplementation grace period could be extended to issuance only for 
encompassed supplementary innovation; for broadening supplementary 
innovation, the end of the grace period could continue to be coupled to pre-grant 
publication.311  
No-fault and at-fault supplementary innovation also present distinct 
considerations. It could be desirable to restrict patents on at-fault supplementary 
innovation to discourage applicants from using supplementary applications to 
correct their own avoidable errors in earlier-filed applications. For example, an 
OPA disclaimer could be rendered ineffective if an original patent applicant 
were found to be at fault for the post-filing innovation’s unpatentability. The 
original application would therefore be prior art to the supplementary 
application, making the supplementary application unpatentable. Clear line-
drawing between no-fault and at-fault supplementary innovation would be 
challenging, but as one example, if claims of an original patent were invalidated 
in litigation for lacking utility, the original patent’s disclosure of the subject 
matter of those claims would be prior art against the supplementary application, 
notwithstanding any OPA disclaimer. This would discourage applicants from 
filing original applications too early in reliance on supplementary 
applications.312 
CONCLUSION 
The difficulty of mapping research and development to the patent system, 
and the accompanying risk that innovators will render their own work 
unpatentable, play an important role in shaping innovators’ patent strategies.313 
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id. § 251(d). 
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Preferential treatment allowing original applicants to patent unpatentable 
follow-on innovation is one way that the patent system has adapted to this 
difficulty. Yet the practice of filing supplementary applications,314 the historical 
development and scope of preferential treatment for original applicants, and the 
theory behind it, are mostly overlooked by scholars.315 
This Article examines these issues and suggests a reform of the statutory 
framework. The reform would alter only a part of patent law’s incredibly 
complex prior art ecosystem. This Article has addressed other ways that 
applicants create their own prior art, such as journal publications, presentations 
at conferences or trade shows, clinical trials, and sales, only in passing, but these, 
too, play an important role in applicants’ strategies for mapping dynamic 
innovation to the patent system. This Article has also touched only very briefly 
on international considerations. Innovation and patent strategy often happen on 
a global scale, so U.S. patent law, while a very significant component, is far from 
the whole picture. Unilateral changes to U.S. law may ultimately have only 
limited impact. Despite these limitations, this Article takes an important step 
toward understanding how dynamic innovation processes are mapped to the 
patent system and how the treatment of applicants’ own prior art affects 
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